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THESIS ABSTRACT

By Kathleen Ducn-Sandberg
The controversial damming of the Delaware River at Tocks Island, authorized by
Congress in 1962, would have created a 37 mile-long reservoir or man-made recreational lake. Tn
preparation, fifteen thousand people were displaced. Victims of social engineering fought the
project for nearly forty years before Congress finally deauthorized it.
Richard Albert wrote the only history of the dam and creation of the surrounding national
park. Before he died in 2009, he admitted he gave the environmental movement too much credit
for stopping the dam. My argument is that time and money were actually the most significant
factors affecting the demise of the dam. Had the first shovel of soil been turned in 1967, the
project might have moved ahead. An examination of LBJ's federal budgets and subsequent
allocations indicates projects that were already started, continued to receive funding. During this
critical window of time, a continued reduction of hnding due to inflation and spending for the
Vietnam War coupled with skyrocketing project costs, made Tocks Island Dam a low fimding
priority and continuously staEled project.
Tocks Island Dam needed to be placed into the broader context of state and national
history, especially the political and economic aspects of both. Major environmental opposition to
the dam did not start until aAer 1970, and after the environmental movement itself started to
attract widespread attention.
The focus of my thesis is the history of the dam's controversial demise. The Tocks Island
Dam project's final demise has been viewed as a victory far environmentalists, but this project
was actually doomed much earlier when President Johnson needed money to simultaneously
fight the War in Vietnam and push through his Great Society legislation. As early as 1967, Erne

Magazine criticized the dam's costs, but it was a lucrative "pork barrel" project and lingered.

Cost increases and budget cuts due to the war delayed the project which got tangled in later
environmental legislation. My thesis demonstrates that a lack of fbnding in the late 1960s handed
the growing environmental movement a later victory in the 1970s.
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INTRODUCTION

The controversial damming of the Delaware River at Tocks Island, authorized by
Congress in 1962, would have created a 37 mile-long reservoir for water, power and flood
control north of the Delaware Water Gap. Viewed by many to be a good idea at the time, the
Tocks Island Dam would have destroyed approximately 12,000 acres of woodlands, virtually
most of the Minisink Valley, and left many very old and historic landmarks underwater. In
preparation for this engineering feat, the Army Corps of Engineers displaced fifteen thousand
people, wiped out several entire towns, large farms, historic roads and the Minisink Flats. All
were either razed or abandoned. These homes and places of historic interest were doomed to
become the bed of a new man-made lake surrounded by the 72,000 acre Delaware Water Gap
National Recreation Area, created by a another bill signed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965
The earth and rock-filled dam was to be built at Tocks Island, a small uninhabited island
in the middle of the Delaware River about five miles north of the Delaware Water Gap. It was to
be 160 feet high and 3,000 feet long. It would have provided approximately 980 cubic feet of
water per second to be used for hydroelectric power and as a water source. Congress had also
authorized the construction of a nearby pumped-storage facility at Sunfish Pond, which would
have been owned and operated by private power companies, that was expected to generate an
estimated 1,300 megawatts of hydroelectric power. Another controversial component of the
project was the establishment of a recreation area surrounding the Tocks site to be run by the

'

National Park Service.

Richard C. Albert, Damming the Delaware: The Rise and Fall of Tocks Island Dam, (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1987 and 2005), pgs. 1-3.

"The overriding decision to dam or not to dam the Minisink must be weighed against its
natural, social and historic heritage," wrote Nancy Shukaitis, former Commissioner of the Four
County Task Force on Tocks Island Dam and longtime resident of the area.' She and countless
others fought the dam project for nearly ten years before the Delaware River Basin Commission
finally voted to terminate the project, which had an estimated price tag that had grown from $90
to more than $400 million
By then it was too late. Bushkill and Dingmans Feny had become ghost towns and
Walpack's population dropped from 384 to 67. People lost their homes, their livelihoods and
their heritage. Park records show 10,000 properties, many belonging to generations of families as
far back as the colonial period, were bought or condemned. More than 3,000 homes occupied by
8,000 people were razed, 25 summer camps, 125 farms and more than 100 businesses, seven
churches and three schools were all demolished or abandoned.' Since then, many historic
landmarks on both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania sides of the river that managed to survive
have languished under the care of the National Park Service because of a lack of funding for
maintenance and restoration. In 2003 the Park Service encouraged former residents, who were
displaced when the park was created, to come back to live and refbrbish their own homes and
pay rent. Judy Peet, a reporter for the Newark Star Ledger wrote:
Instead, the plan revived the anger and despair felt by homeowners who were
booted out nearly forty years ago when government men descended on the valley
-- some say like storm troopers, others say like locusts -- to create the $1 billion
Tocks Island ~ a r n . ~
The emotionally charged environmental reasons for stopping the Tocks Island Dam were a direct
result of the media attention focused on the residents displaced from their homes who joined
"ennis Bertland et al, eds., The Minisink: A Chronicle of One of America's First and Last Frontier: (The Four County
Task Force on the Tocks Island Dam Project, 1975))preface vii.
Judy Peet, A Bitterness Runs Through It, The Star Ledger, 23 November, 2003, p.19.

lbid.

forces with any group they hoped would hrther their cause and condemn what was being done to
them by the Army Corps of Engineers and in effect, the federal government. This attention
happened at the same time and should be considered a part of the budding "Environmental
Movement" that was taking shape in the late 1960s and 1970s. This movement changed pubic
thinking about our natural resources from protective conservationism to pro-active
environmentalism, which resulted in the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act and the
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency a year later.
Before these federal laws were enacted and while public environmental consciousness
was still being raised, the stories emanating from Tocks Island made great press, especially for
nearby urban reporters, who got to take a field trip out to Sussex or Monroe County for the day
to cover an easy "hearts and flowers" story, myself included. Television cameras captured sound

bites from protesting angry residents and Hippie environmentalists who joined them like
sympathetic union strikers as they hugged each other and demonstrated with signs. The
atmosphere was a mixture of hneral-like mourning and tension. "It was like going to someone's
wake," described attorney Donald Stieh, now president of the Walpack Historical Society, whose
family lost their vacation home. "Ithink if a member of the Park Service had wandered onto the
scene, there might have been a lynching."'
Richard Albert was a restoration scientist with the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, a
nonprofit environmental organization that fights proposed dam projects. He previously worked
for the Delaware River Basin Commission, the federal agency charged with building Tocks
Island Dam. Before he died in 2009, Albert wrote the only history of the Tocks Island Dam and
creation of the surrounding national park. He said like many others, he had a change of heart
about saving the Delaware River, but admitted he gave the environmental movement too much
5

Donald Steih, Interviewed by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg, September, 2010.
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credit for stopping the dam. Albert said the volume of research materials he used was large
complex "and usually biased."

"Far anybody who wasn't there at the time, it's hard to imagine the agony people
went through, and for what?'said Albert. "A dam on a river that didn't need it?
Recreation that was already there? Farmland that the government now leases out?
Or for historic homes that the government can't afford to keep? I offer no apology
except to recognize that many subjects touched on could have been explored in
greater detail. A subject for which I would like to see additional professional
study is the striking parallels between Tocks Idand Dam and the Vietnam war."'
How the proposed dam affected local residents and budding environmentalists is only one
aspect of the history of the dam and as sad or news worthy a story as it was, Tocks Island needs
to be placed into the broader context of state and national history, especially the political and
economic aspects of both. Major environmental opposition to the dam did not start until 1970,
considered a late start because the environmental movement itself did not attract widespread
attention until after the first Earth Day celebration was held that year and the "Save the Delaware
Coalition" was organized. Ironically, the leaders of the coalition opposed the dam, but supported
the creation of the recreation area, even though it tripled the amount of land to be confiscated by
the government. The history of the project itself and the emotional effects of social engineering
have been thoroughly written about by AIbert, who fifteen years later said, "Tn spite of all the
real and imagined environmental impacts, it can be argued that the Tocks Tsland Dam was a
victim of cost overruns and the Vietnam

The focus of this thesis is the history of the dam's controversial demise. The Tocks Island
Dam project became irrevocably log-gammed during the Carter Administration and its final
Richard Albert, Interviewed by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg, March, 2008.
Richard Albert, In-Tocks-icated: The Tocks Island Dam Project, Cultural Resource Management-CRM (Published
online by the National Park Service, Volume 25, Issue 03,2002)http://crm.cr.npagov/archive/25-03/25-03-3.pdf
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demise was viewed as a victory for environmentalists, but this project was actually doomed
much earlier when President Johnson needed money to simultaneously fight the War in Vietnam
and push through his Great Society legislation. The project had enormous cost overruns from the

very beginning. As early as 1967, Time Magmine criticized these costs and recommended that
Congress kill the project, but it was a lucrative "pork barrel" project and lingered. Cost increases
and budget cuts due to the war delayed construction and allowed the project to get tangled in
later environmental legislation. My thesis demonstrates that a lack of funding in the late 1960s
handed the growing environmental movement a later victory in the 1970s.

CHAPTER I

The Historic Minisink Valley

The Upper Delaware River Valley, known as the Minisink, encompasses four counties in
two states: Sussex and Warren in New Jersey and Pike and Monroe in Pennsylvania. It stretches
for forty miles on either side of the Delaware River from the Delaware Water Gap to Port Jervis,
New York and is bordered by small mountain ranges on either side, the Kittatinny in New Jersey
and the Poconos in Pennsylvania. The Delaware River flows from ancient glacial sources in the
Catskill Mountains in New York and empties into the Delaware Bay below Wilmington,
Delaware.
Before the first Europeans explored or attempted to settle the Delaware River Valley the
most prevalent tribe of Indians to occupy this territory were the Lenape, a branch of the
Algonquian nation. Many historians have documented that Henry Hudson, sailing for the Dutch
West India Company, was the first European to inadvertently discover the Delaware River in
1609, as well as the Hudson River, during his explorations to find a water route to China.

However, he did not sail up the Delaware River and stayed in the vicinity of what now is known
as Delaware Bay. The land was claimed by the Dutch and called New Netherland. There are
conflicting accounts of attempted Dutch settlements in the area known as the Minisink Valley
prior to 1664 when the English gained control of what became the New York and New Jersey
colonies. Early Dutch copper mining remains somewhat of a legend as there is little evidence
left today of these alleged mine sites, only a few openings where they could have possibly used a

pick and wedge technique to mine copper north of Tocks Island and haul the ore a distance of
104 miles to "Esopus" on the Hudson, present day Kingston, New York, for shipment abroad.

"

During the colonial period most of this area was owned by members of the West Jersey
Proprietors. Arty possible claims to land by remaining Indians were disregarded. Some of the
houses built by early settlers served as forts and there are many accounts of Indians raids and
massacres during the French and Indian War. In the summer of 1755 the Minisink Indians
attempted to retake their former lands on both sides of the river. For several years the Indians
raided homes and farms all along the Delaware, killing and scalping men, women and children
and burning their houses and barns. Similar attacks took place throughout the river valley until
1763. Numerous attempted copper mining operations in the lathcentury all failed and by the late

1800s the Pahaquarry Mining Company, the last mining operation, closed. A 1944 geology
report on the minerals in the Pahaquarry mines concluded the principal mineral available in
abundance was a low grade copper sulfide, a mineral hardly worth the effort and expense to
mine. The site of these abandoned copper mines was eventually taken over by the Boy Scouts
and turned into Camp Pahaquarra that operated until the Army Corps of Engineers forced them
to close in 1969 in preparation for the Tocks Island ~ a r n . ~

Henry Charlton Beck, The Roads of Home, Lanes and Legends of New Jersey, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1987), p. 8. In The Roads of Home, Lanes and Legends of New Jersey by Henry Charlton Beck, he cited an
1787 interview in Hazard's Register with area resident Nicholas Dupius, who said there was a company of Dutch
miners from New York who operated the Pahaquarry mines and built about one hundred miles of road, (now Old
Mine Road) in the 17"' Century, while later historians, Herbert Kraft and Peter 0. Wacker, who have studied the
area extensively, disagree that European settlement in the area could not have occurred until much later because
Native American hostility made settlement nearly impossible for such early Dutch settlement.
Peter 0. Wacker, NewJerseyls Cultural Resources A. D. 1660- 1810,(New Jersey DEP, Historic Preservation Office,
22, January, 2010 www.nj.gov/dep/hpo/ .../pg 199~NJCulturalResourc1660~1810Wacker.pdf),pgs. 199 - 204.
Peter 0. Wacker, Land and PeoplerA Cultural Geography of Preindustrial New Jersey (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1975), pgs. 234-235.
Herbert C. Kraft, The Dutch, the Indians and the Quest for Copper: Pahaquarry and the Old Mine Road, (South
Orange, Seton Hall University Museum, 1996), p. 91
9
Bertrand, p. 42

The Minisink Valley saw military activity in both the French & Indian and Revolutionary
Wars. In 1763, during the French and Indian War, the Van Campen house sheltered 150 people
from the threat of Indian attack and in December 1776, General Gates stayed there with his
colonial troops enroute to Trenton. In 1778 Brig. General Casimir Pulaski, a Polish
Revolutionary soldier, brought 250 cavalrymen down the Old Mine Road and wintered there for
two months A large majority of the 13,000 colonists who lived in the area were Patriot
supporters of the Re~olution.'~
Despite the failed attempts at mining, settlement continued and the Old Mine Road was
used to haul wheat and other products to Kingston and the Delaware River was used for
transportation and floating logs downriver to sawmills. Recent residents, the descendents of early
settlers with names including, Rosencrans, Westbrook, Spangenburg, Hull, Decker, Losey,
Depue, and Smith, trace their heritage to this area and these peop1e:These early settlers farmed,
logged or worked for canals and railroads that were later built in the area. During the early days
of the Industrial Revolution the Morris Canal was built across New Jersey, linking the Delaware
River to the Hudson River. The canal enabled farmers to ship crops and farm products to city
markets and it also fueled industry with coal fiom Pennsylvania, limestone and iron ore.

The Search for Water

It was shortly after the Revolutionary War that the problems of water supply for the
region and navigation, energy, and flood-control issues of the Delaware River began. These
issues were shared by New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and even Delaware, and led to more
than two hundred years of disputes and poorly planned cooperative efforts, including the
10

The National Park Service Website: www.nps.gov/dewa/historyculture/stories-tocks.htm
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proposed Tocks Island Dam. The Delaware River supplied early merchants, farmers and loggers
with an inexpensive way to transport goods to the markets of Easton, Trenton and Philadelphia.

The river's numerous tributaries also allowed for essential transportation of goods and supplies
as well. People were so dependent on these smaller streams and the Delaware River that in 1783
New Jersey and Pennsylvania appointed commissioners to decide the ownership of each
Delaware River island and Albert said it was declared the "whole length and breadth thereof, is
and shall continue to be and remain a common highway, equally free and open for use, benefit
and advantage of each state."" This meant that no one could build a dam across the Delaware
River unless both sides agreed. It also meant that water could not be diverted fiom the river if the
diversion substantially reduced river flows.

The Industrial Revolution created a great need for coal to power manufacturing and
transportation. Huge coal fields had been discovered in Pennsylvania and coal had to be
transported downstream. In 1823, the 72 mile Lehigh Canal was opened and the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company played a major role for years in keeping water-supply dams from being
built on the Delaware River. Other canals were soon constructed: the Morris Canal from
Phillipsburg to Jersey City; the Delaware Division of the Pennsylvania Canal from Easton to
Bristol; the Delaware and Raritan Canal that spanned from Bordentown and Trenton to New
Bnmswick, and the Delaware and Hudson Canal. The common destinations of these various
canal systems were the industrial cities and terminal ports of New York City, Jersey City and
Philadelphia. The Industrial Revolution of course led to huge population increases in these areas
and an ever increasing need for potable water.
As electricity replaced steam as a source of energy, New Jersey recognized the potential
of the Delaware River for hydroelectric power (the use of water falls to drive turbines). In 1897,
11

Albert, p. 5
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the state legislature enacted a law allowing companies to be formed specifically for building
hydroelectric dams. In 1902 the first hydropower project for the Delaware River was proposed
by the Delaware Water Gap Power Company and the region north of the Delaware Water Gap
was surveyed, including Tocks Island.
In 1907, during the height of Teddy Roosevelt-style conservationism, the New York
legislature authorized its Water Supply Commission to conduct flood control and power
development studies, which recommended building three power dams along the upper Delaware
River in New York. Concurrent with this study was the 1908 ThirdAm~zmlReporl qf the New

York State FVater Commission, another study that considered building forty hydropower dams
upstream from Port Jervis, including creating a series of Delaware River lakes that would each
be from five to ten miles long that "would convert the region into a beautiful and attractive
pleasure resort and greatly increase the land values."'*

In 1920, the New Jersey based Delaware River Improvement Company applied to the
Pennsylvania Water Supply Commission for approval to build a hydroelectric dam near
Belvidere. Not sure of its jurisdiction, the commission requested an opinion from the state's
attorney general, who upheld the Treaty of 1783. Concurrent legislative action of both states
would be necessary. By 1913, the Delaware River Development Company was incorporated to
pursue the same project. This company spent eight years trying to get the project approved and
bought land on both sides of the river, but it never overcame the obstacles of the Treaty of 1783.

By the 1920s the lumber raRing industry on the DeIaware, which had been responsible
for the New Jersey/Pennsylvania anti-dam treaty and was a great obstacle to using the Delaware
River for hydropower, was dead. Interest in using the Delaware River as a water supply then
became an over-riding concern.
12

Albert, p. 8

Finding adequate supplies of fresh clean water had long been a problem for the more
populated areas of New York City and Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin left the city of
Philadelphia money in his will to build a public water supply system and by 1850 a waterworks
on the Schuykill River was supplying seven million gallons ofwater. Philadelphia's use of a
Delaware River estuary at the Kensington works was also expanded until the Delaware River
was providing fifty percent of Philadelphia's water supply. However, because of the growth in
manufacturing and increased population, the water quality quickly became very poor as the city
dumped unrestricted waste into the Schuykill and lower Delaware. Upstream pollution was also
increasing from Port Jervis and hrther polluted Philadelphia's water supply.
New York City had water supply problems almost fi-om the time Peter Minuit purchased
Manhattan Island from the Indians in 1626. Diseases, including yellow fever, cholera and
typhoid fever were attributed to contaminated water and there was an inadequate supply of water
to fight fires. Historian Charles Weidner wrote:
As the city built up and the density of the population increased, numerous wells
became polluted with the seepage of privies, cesspools, and the drainage from the
streets. As early as 1750 the water was notoriously foul. l3
Manhattan Island's early water supply came from "the Collect" a spring-fed, fi-esh-water
pond that extended from Pearl Street to Franklin Street, an area of about 48 acres. It supplied
mostly polluted water to Manhattan's inhabitants, who at this time were crowded in the lower
end of the island. By 1774, the city moved to construct a municipally owned water supply
system, in the form of a well that would supply water to a reservoir on Broadway between Pearl
and White Streets powered by a steam engine that would distribute the water by pipe throughout

13

Charles H. Weidner, Water for a City: a History of New Yofk City's Problem From the Beginning t o the Delaware

River System, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974) p.14

the city. The supply proved to be insuficient and the quality of the water was again, very poor.
As a result the project was abandoned. Between 1785 and 1798 numerous plans, most involving
the Collect as a main source were considered and rejected by the Common Council.
In 1799 the New York State Legislature passed "an act for supplying the City of New
York with pure and wholesome water." The Common Council accepted this bill with reluctance
because authority over the City's water was given to a private corporation, a bank, the Manhattan
Company, incorporated by Assemblyman Aaron Burr. The Manhattan Company had complete
control over the City's water supply and had a mandate to solve the supply problem within ten
years However, banking turned out to be a more profitable undertaking for Burr and little was
done except to lay 20 miles of wooden water mains that carried an unfit and inadequate supply of
water to less than a third of the City's population of over 200,000. The other two thirds of the
city still depended on wells or other sources for water. There was no citywide sewer system and
scientists estimated one hundred tons of human excrement was being put into the porous soil of
lower Manhattan Island daily. In addition, there was seepage fiom graveyards and the drainage
fiom stables and the filthy streets. Weidner noted: "The stench arising from the streets was
appalling."1"

A devastating fire in 1835 forced the city to build a reservoir in the Croton watershed in
Westchester County. A forty-two mile aqueduct, receiving reservoirs and other parts of a waterdistribution system were built, yet it only took six years before this system became too small to
meet water demands. The system was expanded continuously and still exists today During the
period of heavy immigration fiom Europe between 1850 and 1900, the city's population grew
from a half-million to three and a half million with more than 135,000 people moving into the
city each year. Consumption of water naturally increased. Users of this early system consumed
14

Weidner, p. 23
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an average of 20 gallons a day, but by 1895 the average daily use had increased to 145 gallons
per day, because industrial and commercial use was included. Albert wrote:
Philadelphia and New York had taken distinctly different approaches to solving
their early water problems. Philadelphia had taken the least costly approach by
tapping ample, nearby water sources. However, its water supplies had become
grossly polluted. New York City had taken the bold approach of building
reservoirs in distant areas and then bringing the water to its citizens. But the city's
program could not keep pace with the tremendous growth in population and water
consumption.

Between 1907 and 1928 New York built the Catskill System, above the Hudson River
connecting the Schoharie and Ashokan Reserviors by 144 miles of aqueducts, but even before it
was completed, it was already determined to be inadequate. New York predicted it would run out

of water by the mid 1930s. One of the most viable alternatives considered by the city's engineers
was to develop watersheds on the Delaware River. The Pennsylvania Water and Power
Resources Board also conducted a study that concluded a dam across the Delaware River at
Walpack Bend would be an inexpensive way to solve Philadelphia's water supply needs.
New Jersey also had growing water supply concerns. By 1900 more than two million
people lived in the northern urban parts of the state and supplies were running low. The North
Jersey Water Supply District began a series of studies beginning with the Hazen Study, which
recommended construction of a reservoir on the Raritan River above Somerville that could be
augmented by pumping water from the Delaware River into the Raritan near Clinton and
building a pump station near Belvidere on the Delaware. The Long Hill project proposed
building eight interconnected reservoirs on various Delaware River tributaries with the final
stage of the project being a pump station near Walpack Bend not far from Tocks Island. Neither

15

Albert, p. 13

the Hazen nor the Long Hill projects were built. The ultimate solution to the water needs of
North Jersey seemed to lead to the Delaware River.
In 1923 the Delaware River Treaty Commission was created by legislative action in the
three states. The commission's job was to negotiate an interstate agreement that would govern
each state's water projects in the Delaware River Basin. Federal agencies were invited to
participate as advisors. Staff of various state agencies, New York City, the Federal Power
Commission and the United States Army Corps of Engineers, conducted work on drafting an
interstate compact that they adopted on January 24, 1925, establishing the permanent regulatory
Tri-State Delaware River Commission. The proposed compact stipulated Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and New York share equally in the DeIaware River's water above Port Jervis and below
that point, the Delaware was to be shared only by New Jersey and Penn~ylvania.'~
From the beginning, the three states ran into politically motivated obstacles while
attempting to pass the compact bill. New Jersey amendments were rejected by Pennsylvania and
the powerful and politically connected Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company lobbied vigorously
against the bill's passage there. The company had been given water rights to the Lehigh River
during the building of the Lehigh Canal 100 years earlier and wanted to keep its Philadelphia
customers. New York State, who had the most to gain, passed the compact quickly. Even with
amendments, the New Jersey legislature still hesitated to pass the bi11.17
A newer and less ambitious compact was approved by the Commission in 1927, which

gave each state an initial allocation of 600 million gallons of water per day. Again, New York
passed the compact treaty quickly in 1927 and the bill again stalled in both Pennsylvania and in
New Jersey. A focus of the debates was the amount of water flow that would be restricted below

16
17

Albert, pgs. 15-17
Albert, p. 18

Port Jervis, and concerns the river would become a mere brook during the summer. Trenton was
also concerned about the quality of the water that would flow down a restricted Delaware. The
city had been experiencing pollution problems during low-flow periods when thunderstorms
washed coal and industrial wastes out of the Lehigh River Valley. New Jersey Iegislators were
very concerned about differences between state and commission engineers7 findings on the
Trenton issue. When Pennsylvania would not agree to an increase in the minimum flow
requirements, New Jersey killed the bill in 1928.
The City of New York threatened to sue and made preparations to begin an independent
water diversion project. New Jersey reacted immediately when the attorney general's office filed
a lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court against New York State and New York City on
May 20, 1929, to keep the city from diverting water out of the Delaware River Basin In this suit,
New Jersey claimed New York's diversion would destroy the basin environmentally and claimed
that the Secretary of War had to approve any diversions that would affect the river's navigability.
They also cried that New York City's use of water was extravagant.

On May 4th,1931, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court, which affirmed New York's right to divert water fiom the Delaware based on a principle
of equitable apportionment. He ruled each state in the Delaware River Basin had a right to a fair
share of the water. New York was limited to taking 440 million gallons daily, but New York City
was required to release from its holding reservoirs enough water to maintain a minimum flow at
Port Jervis and Trenton. The ruling also stipulated that accredited representatives from New
Jersey and Pennsylvania had the right to inspect New York City's water works, meters, and other
apparatus and records relating to the inflow, outflow and diverted flow of the river. New York
was also required to build a sewage treatment facility in Port Jewis to prevent hrther future

pollution, but New York had no money to start this first diversion so deadlines were moved up to
1940. A large portion of what became the Merriman Dam on Roundout Creek at Lackawack,

New York in the Catskills, part of the Delaware System of supply, was not built until after World
War 11.'"
The Supreme Court ruling in the Delaware River Case ended a very important decade for
the Delaware River and outlined the rules that would govern the Delaware River for many years

to come. Water supply emerged as the overriding concern in the basin, and the first water-supply
dam had been proposed for the Delaware River. The interest in water supply resulted in the
negotiation of two revolutionary interstate compacts. While neither of these compacts was
adopted, they ultimately resulted in an expensive, two-year water fight waged before the United
States Supreme Court. "The rules for playing the water game in the Delaware had now been
established," wrote Albert.l 9
The Army Corps of Engineers, a public engineering, design and construction
management agency, had been established by the Continental Congress in 1775. It was
disbanded after the Revolution and reorganized in 1802. Non-military engineering projects of the
Corps were usually limited to improvements in navigation, canals and roads, but as time went on,
their responsibilities grew to include the planning and operation of locks and dams, flood control,
waterway dredging and beach erosion. Recently, environmental regulation and ecosystem
restoration were added to the list of responsibilities.
Many reports and articles mistakenly state that the Army Corps of Engineers did not get
involved in the Tocks Island project until after 1955. According to Albert, the first Corps activity
in the Delaware River above Trenton was an 1872 study they conducted to examine the costs of

'"eidner,
p. 313
Albert, p. 25

removing navigation hazards for lumber rafting between Trenton and Port Jervis. In 1934, the
Corps submitted the "Delaware River 308 Report," the first comprehensive water-resources plan
ever developed for the Delaware River Basin. It not only examined navigation, hydroelectric
power, flood control, and irrigation, but also water supply and water quality. The report primarily
dealt with potential dams for hydropower and water supply. Of the 32 dam sites the Corps
examined, Tocks Island showed the most promise. The Corps water supply plan assumed New
York City would be completing a second diversion to the headwaters of the Delaware by
1950.The Corps proposed a large reservoir in the Neversink Valley and a Delaware River
reservoir near Barryville, New York. To establish a similar water supply plan for New Jersey and

Pennsylvania, Albert said the Corps proposed building a large reservoir at Tocks Island. "A dam
in the Minisink Valley was considered ideal because the valley was not occupied by railways or
extensive and highly valuable improvements,"20 The Corps found the development of the
Delaware River Basin economically feasible and a project that at the time, did not warrant
federal participation. Instead, they recommended an interstate agency be formed to complete the
project. There was little opposition or reaction to this study because there was no money for it.
The country was suffering from the Great Depression and the creation of a similar project by the
Tennessee Valley Authority was very controversial.
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Integrated Water Project

10 MOW Y w k City

Early Army Corps of E~tgineersIncodel Dam plan map shows W @ u k Bend as the
p r i q dam site. Lder the site war chmged to nearby Tach ~ s l a d '
In anticipation of the 308 Report, the Electric Power Company of New Jersey was
incorporated and later applied to the Federal Power Commission for permits to build
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hydroelectric dams at Tocks Island, Belvidere and Chestnut Hill. New York City, Philadelphia
and other cities opposed the project because they wanted dam sites preserved for water-supply
uses that would benefit various coal and private power companies and did not want any possible
competition from New Jersey.
Following two damaging floods in 1936, the federal government passed the Flood
Control Act of 1936, expanding the federal government's roIe in flood control and givins this
responsibility to the Army Corps of Engineers, making it the "nation's largest dam-building
agency " The three principle states continued to conduct intermittent studies for the next few
years, but nothing was agreed upon.
In 1949, the Delaware River Development Corporation was established in New Jersey
and by 1951 the company received a Federal Power Commission Preliminary Permit to study
three suggested Delaware River power dam sites, the largest to be at Tocks Island. The proposal
to build dams across the Delaware River governed by an interstate compact continued. A new
group of proponents, assisted by another interstate water fight and a devastating flood, stepped
forward to promote the Belvidere and Chestnut Hill dam sites while Tocks Island lurked in the
shadows.22Pennsylvania meanwhile continued to consider Walpack Bend as a possible dam site.
On May 25, 1955, the Department of Forests and Waters hired the engineering firm of Albright
and Friel, Inc. to review the design of the Walpack Bend dam proposal and provide 1955 cost
estimates. It was clear by 1955 that plans were being made to dam the main stem of the
Delaware River.
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The Great Flood of 1955: A Turning Point for Delaware Dam Management

In August, 1955 hurricanes Connie and Diane dumped nearly 20 inches of rain causing
the Delaware River to rage and flood. These two simultaneous tropical storms caused the Great
Delaware River Flood of 1955, which claimed the lives of more than 200 people and destroyed
or heavily damaged several thousand homes and businesses. A thirty foot high wall of water
crashed onto a cIubkouse at Camp Davis killing thirty-seven young campers and their
counselors. Military helicopters airlifted hundreds of more fortunate children from other flooded
campsites along the Delaware. Water surges left some towns along the river under nearly ten feet
of water, while four bridges between the Delaware Water Gap and Trenton collapsed, including
the Columbia Portland Bridge that eventually slammed into and destroyed the Northampton Free
B r i d ~ ethat spanned between Phillipsburg and Easton, Pennsylvania. This tragedy in the east,
where floods were uncommon, received tremendous media attention. As President Eisenhower
arrived, the New York and Philadelphia media raced to the scene to report on the region's worst
natural disaster, with $500 million in property losses in thirteen states.
For many years people incorrectly credited the Great Delaware River Flood of 1955 as
the sole motive for building the Tocks Island Dam. According to Albert, plans for a dam were
already under consideration prior to the flood, which drew considerable attention and support for
dam legislation. "The long-standing efforts of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and New Jersey were
being pursued vigorously even as the first raindrops

After the Flood of 1955 there was a

great push to dam the Delaware River and the Army Corps of Engineers were welcomed with
open arms to help get it accomplished. Prior to the flood, federal involvement had been minimal.
The 308 Report of 1934 and subsequent reviews could never find any justification for federal
L3
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dams above Trenton. Within a week after the flood, however, Representative Francis Walter of
Easton called on the governors of Pennsylvania and New Jersey to urge approval of flood-control
dams on the Delaware River. Before the flood debris was cleared, officials had Albright and
Friel's engineering report on their desks. The $70 million dam outlined in the report provided
flood control, recreation, power, and water supply benefits. Located behind the dam, which was
still supposed to be located at Walpack Bend, was a proposed 25 mile-long lake and profitable
power facilities. "Coming right after the most devastating flood in Delaware River history, it
looked particularly good," wrote Albert. He said politicians jumped on the dam bandwagon and
with a flurry of resolutions, ordered reviews of old studies and new ones. There were public
hearings on the extent of the flood damages and opinions were solicited on a possible dam
project. "At all the hearings, local and state interests were unanimous in their desire for the
federal government to take a lead role in the water affairs of the Delaware River Basin," wrote
~ 1 b e 1 - t .he
~ ~most comprehensive study of the Delaware River Basin had begun with reports and
studies being done by numerous agencies and government departments. There was little doubt

from the beginning that the survey would recommend one or more dams for the Delaware River.
In February, 1957 the Corps concluded that a dam could be built at Tocks Island if an earth filled
structure was used. This reservoir at Tocks Island could hold twice as much water as a reservoir
built with a dam at the alternative site of Walpack Bend because Tocks was eight miles fbrther
downstream and the reservoir could flood the Flat Brook section of New Jersey. It was viewed as
a tremendous cost savings and killed the Walpack Bend plan.

On March 25, 1957 the Ford Foundation awarded a $1 3 1,000 grant for a study of
potential administrative organizations for interstate river basins. The grant for the study went to
Syracuse University. They recommended a water resource agency be established by compact
24
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with the federal government as a partner. This agency was to have broad powers within the
framework of existing federal, state, and local agencies to provide overall planning, coordination
and supervision. This powefil interstate agency, the Delaware River Basin Commission,

(DRBC) was con~posedof five commissioners, who were the governors of New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Delaware and the United States Secretary of the Interior. It still exists
today
In 1960, the Corps completed the "Comprehensive Survey of the Wnter Reso?rrce.softhe

Delaware Basin." This eleven volume study, which became House Document 522, served for
years as the basis of evaluation for the Tocks lsland Dam project. The compact bill for the
Delaware River Basin passed the legislatures of all four states involved. President Kennedy
appointed his Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, to be the chief decision-maker on the
compact. Lobbying for the legislation was strong and on June 29, the House passed the measure.
Udall announced that the Kennedy administration favored the compact and on September 16,
1961, the Senate passed the compact legislation unanimously. President Kennedy signed the bill

into law on September 27 and thirty days later, the Delaware River Basin Compact was law. On
January 1, 1962, Congress formalized the Delaware River Basin Commission and on October 23,
1962, Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1962, which Albert said contained nearly two
hundred public-works projects nationwide and the "queen of its projects was the Tocks Island
Dam."

"By the end of 1962, proponents of a Delaware River dam had every reason to
rejoice," said Albert. "All the elements needed to build Tocks Island Dam had
been accomplished: federal authorization, the creation of the long-sought
interstate agency, and the creation of general public support for the pro-ject. None
of these had been accidents. The creation of the Tocks Island Dam project had
been a well-orchestrated endeavor. After this accomplishment, building a dam
would seem easy."25
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CHAPTER 11
President Johnson: The Environment, Vietnam and the Economy

What conclusions can be drawn about the history and state of the modern environmental
movement by the end of the Johnson administration and what did Johnson or Kennedy do, if
anything, to promote the growth of the movement during this time period when projects like the
Tocks Island Dam were being routinely built? Was LBJ a conservationist or an environmental
president and how did this proposed dam and national recreational park fit into his national
domestic policy, especially his Great Society programs and was it affected by the War in
Vietnam? Had the environmental movement grown so strong and powefil nationally that it
reached the White House and influenced the Johnson Administration not to build Tocks Island,
or was it just a question of economics~Just how much did Johnson personally adopt a modern
environmental philosophy rather than remedial conse~ationismhas been a subject examined by
historians who have been scrutinizing the more recently released documents of Johnson's
presidential papers during the past two decades
When the Tocks project was first authorized, it seemed to have widespread appeal The
only significant opposition came from the local residents who were to be displaced Some 600 of
them filed a class action suit against the project in 1965, but the case was ironically dismissed on
the grounds that the government had not consented to be sued. The Army Corps began buying
property and evictins residents, but little attention was focused on the dam project itself until
1968 when two power companies proposed using Sunfish Pond near Tocks Island as the upper

reservoir for a pumped storage electric generating facility. The property surrounding the pond
had once been owned by the state of New Jersey, but had been sold to the power companies. The
destruction ofthis pond, a favorite hiking destination in the Appalachian ridge overlooking the

Delaware, drew public opposition and resulted in a grassroots campaign to "Save Sunfish Pond."
This small but successful controversy drew the attention of the media and eventually junior New
Jersey Assemblyman Thomas Kean who introduced a bill opposing it and urged the state to
reclaim the property. Although the bill never went anywhere, eventually the DRBC caved into
local pressure and the facility was built at another site, Yards Creek in Blairstown, New Jersey.
Irene Travis Thompson, Professor Emeriti of Sociology, wrote:
Apart from this minor episode, environmental groups seemed favorably disposed
toward the (Tocks Island) project because they saw it as an alternative to the
growing commercial development of the area. The dam and associated recreation
area were perceived as a way to prevent the kind of unpleasant sprawl and
destruction that have taken place in the nearby Pocono Mountains area."
The Army Corps began buying small amounts of land in the Minisink area in 1965 and
continued to do so throughout the late sixties despite hnding cutbacks. Slowly, a controversy
over the dam project began to develop and by the late 1960s the cast of opposing groups
included: the Delaware Rver Basin Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers, the National
Park Service, Congress, (especially the Public Works and Appropriations Committees,) newly
established state departments of environmental protection, a variety of environmental and public
interest groups especially the Environmental Defense Fund and the Save the Delaware Coalition,
power companies, water supply companies, members of the fishing, farming, real estate, hotel
and tourism industries, highway and construction unions, various Chambers of Commerce, local
residents, and a large number of state and local officials. Some believed there was a lot of money
to be made and sides had been drawn. As studies of the costs and benefits of the dam
proliferated, environmental concerns seemed to serve as the dominant force behind the groups
opposed to the dam, while dam proponents stressed the values of efficiency, growth, and
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economics. This impasse caused the Tocks project to take on public significance at the end of the
decade.27In 1973, Michael Frome, wrote what became the environmentalists' manifesto for the
Save the Delaware Coalition entitled: The Tocks IslandDam: n Prelimir~aryReview. Frome
wrote:
Concerned citizens all over the country are watching Tocks Island. . . .This is an
issue of national magnitude, in which the little people who care will have their
day. It marks the dawning of a new day, when the long-range effects on the
environment must be measured, understood and evaluated before the shovel is
turned, not after.28
Travis-Thompson called Tocks Island a turtling paint in environmental decision making
"Implicitly it is also a defense against the image of environmentalists as a small elitist group who
care more about rivers and fish and trees than about the exigencies and realities of human ~ i f e . " ~ "
In 1970, Congress ordered construction of the dam to begin as soon as approval was
granted by the Council on Environmental Quality. The Corps issued its legislatively required
Environmental Impact Statement in 1971, but the brief statement was met with criticism by the
Council, which demanded revisions and further studies. After that, opposition gained momentum
as politicians and the public turned against the project. Some believe the argument had turned
around in a new environmentally friendly and conscious political climate. Others wanted to stop
the creation of a huge national park with a man-made lake and recreational facilities expected to
draw crowds of ten million annually from the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas.
Surrounding small rural town residents had a xenophobic fear of being over-run by "city people."
The mayor of one town in Warren County told a newspaper reporter that everyone would have to
buy new locks for their doors to protect themselves from the hordes of the unwashed. Especially
in New Jersey there was concern for the areas surrounding the proposed park and the costs of
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providing expanded infrastructure such as highways, hospitals, police and fire protection and the
growth of service related businesses such as hotels, restaurants, gas stations and convenience
stores. Travis-Thompson wrote:
Far from protecting the area against unwanted growth, the dam came to be seen as
encouraging industrial and residential development by providing more water and
power and bringing in tourist and commercial development along with the
recreation fa~ility.~'
A small number of environmental opponents were concerned about traffic, congestion,

waste disposal, seasonal drawdown, eutrophication and damage to fisheries, the yearly shad
spawns and the oyster beds of the Delaware Bay. Destruction of the last sizable free-flowing
river in the east, the displacement of local communities and destruction of a picturesque and
historic valley became significant reasons for some people like former New Jersey Governor
William Cahill to openly oppose the dam in 1972, even though credit for stopping the project is
publicly credited to Governor Brendan Byrne, who voted as a member of the Delaware River
Basin Commission to recommend Congress de-authorize the project. Some authors and
scientists, who today consider themselves environmentalists, believe the end of the dam pro-iect
was a victory for the environmental movement. Princeton Professor, Dr. Robert Socolow agreed.
"It was only the beginning of the environmental movement, but people came to
understand how they had been vastly underestimating what a valuable
environmental resource the area truly is," said SocoIow. "By then, we had landed
on the moon and saw the earth from the outside. Ecologists, biologists, scientists
began asking questions We came to realize this dam wasn't the big gift we had
been led to think it was "71

President Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society were ambitious programs
that both depended heavily on economic growth. Following the stagnation of the Depression in
the 1930s, World War I1 ignited the economy and helped create an unprecedented period of
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affluence that lasted for the next two decades. Population growth, suburbanization and the
emergence of the Sunbelt provided additional tax resources for national security and public
services. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cut signed into law in 1964 greatly expanded economic
demand and expansion and heled the vision for Johnson's Great Society domestic programs.
Johnson's patriotism, political acumen, and social activism, as well as his economic
inexperience, notorious obstinance, personal abusiveness and egotism all seemed to know no
boundaries. "Hell, we're the richest country in the world, the most powefil. We can do it all,"
said LBJ. "We can do it if we believe it."32Johnson believed the United States was the world's
military defender of democracy. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, there were 16,000
military personnel in Vietnam and the United States helped overthrow the repressive South
Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Fearful of both Eisenhower and Kennedy critics,
Johnson was determined to continue fighting communism and staythe-course in Vietnam, a
decision that would later prove to be fatal to his presidency.
Domestically, Johnson was in a race to push through an enormous amount of liberal
legislation aimed at improving the quality of American life and remediating the polluting effects
of post World War I1 industrial growth. Environmental historian Samuel P. Hays said this period
included a shift from concern about creating outdoor recreation and preserving wildlands and
open space to more of a focus on preserving nature and ecological balance and stopping man's
encroachment on nature. People in government had begun adapting environmental sensibilities
and langwage. Modern environmentalism was slowly surfacing. Hays said traditionally,
conservationistsjustified the utilization of all natural resources if they were used efficiently and
economically, as opposed to preservationists, who wanted to save or preserve them Within the
framework of centralized federal bureaucracy, post-industrial law and policy makers had focused
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on utilization, sound conservation practices and of course, making money from manipulating
natural resources. Naturally, there had been feuds over the control of valuable resources among
those who wanted to exploit them for commercial purposes, both privately and publicly. 31
Following the Great Depression, several land and river resource development projects had been
created during FDR's New Deal, including the famous Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a
multipurpose river flood- control and hydro-electric project that created jobs and resulted in
significant regional growth and development.
The modern environmental movement in the United States had its roots in the 1960s with
a more public focus on preservation, balanced naturalism, anti-pollution and public health,
outdoor recreation and the development ofthe ecological sciences. The concept of
"environmental protection" is often linked to the idealistic sixties generation and was frequently
and negatively associated with the anti-war, civil rights and anti-poverty movements. As it
evolved and gained popularity, the environmental movement cut across various political and
demographic boundaries. Uncontrolled economic growth and wasted resources began to outrage
avid environmentalists, who had formed national advocacy groups such as the Environmental
Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council by 1970 The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 signified the first active political participation in the shift from conservation
to environmentalism, but Lyndon Johnson's presidency had ended during the middle of this
transition period and so did the hnding for Tocks Island Dam.
Both Kennedy's and Johnson's concerns for the environment were rhetoricai and reactive
Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, who served both presidents, said Kennedy knew the issues and
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recognized their importance, but never raised any issues of environmental concern himself.34
Udall said Johnson incorporated a great deal more environmental philosophy into his Great
Society legislation, including nearly three hundred conservation measures, but many of these
issues were included in Great Society legislative programs because they were holdovers from the
Kennedy administration or because Johnson had ordered his special assistant for domestic
affairs, Joseph Califano, to gather and prioritize the most urgent social needs facing the nation
and had the young lawyer create a "shopping list" of Great Society issues and programs that
warranted intervention by the federal government.
Declassified primary source documents in the LBJ Presidential Library, part of the
"American Presidency Project," prompted historian Robert A. Divine to edit a compilation of
articles that were a revisionary examination of the Johnson presidency. In this volume,
environmental and public policy historian, Martin Melosi, asked an important question: Was
Johnson's new conservationism really new?35While Johnson's idealism was mostly tempered by
political pragmatism and numerous historians and biographers have concluded he had no true
personal commitment to the growing environmental movement, Hays said he believes the
Johnson administration should be viewed as a transitional period in the evolution from old-style
conservationism to modern environmenta~ism.~~
In his conclusions about the Johnson
administration's conservation achievements, Udall said he tried to alert Johnson that trends
towards total environmental awareness and quality of life were becoming the central focus of
"new conservation."
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"Well, he was always receptive," said Udall. "Rasically his instincts were very
good, as I say the instincts of a rural person who has a feeling for the land and
who came up through the New Deal (when Roosevelt with the country flat on its
back, said,) "Well let's start rebuilding," and you started with the land, building
dams and soil erosion, replanting forests. It was a great
Melosi said Johnson took advantage of the growing environmental movement when it
served his needs, but his usual motives were often insipid and he was distracted by partisan
considerations and preoccupied by the Vietnam War. He unintentionally let his administration
develop and propose environmental policies and legislation and relegated national
"beautification"programs to his genuinely capable wife, First Lady Bird Johnson that included
removing billboards and junkyards from highways, anti-littering campaigns and the creation of

new national parks. There are several famous White House photos of the First Lady being guided
down the Colorado River or through the Redwoods accompanied by Udall. "By happy
coincidence, rising grass-roots interest in quality of life issues tapped the spirit of the Great
Society that President Johnson envisioned," wrote ~ e l o s i . However,
'~
even aRer the Department
of Environmental Protection had been established later during President Nixon's administration,
environmental programs remained diffised and policy fragmented. There was only minimal
federal environmental protection before 'Nixon with little environmental concern being raised by
lawmakers about Congressional dam building projects like Tocks Island.
Udall wrote that he personally had an "environmental epiphany" and began to refocus his
orientation after reading Rachel Carson's ground breaking environmental book, Silent Spriq, on
the harmful long-term effects of the pesticide DDT. Like thousands of others who read it at the
time, this book caused Udall to realize how vulnerable and fragile the earth's ecosystems were
and how we were carelessly destroying them. Udall slowly began to reshape his department's
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goals and was full of new ideas and promoted new legislation to expand his department. During

u

his tenure he managed to help pass landmark legislation to protect the natural "beauty" of the
land and curb pollution. "In fact, the only brake he ever felt was in the latter years of the Johnson
administration when the war in Vietnam squeezed his budget, a victim of guns over butter,"
wrote

ern stein.^' The Great Society laws passed attributed to the Johnson's administration

included: the Clear Air Act; the Wilderness Act of 1964; Water Quality and Clean Water
Restoration Acts and Amendments; the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act; the 1965 Motor Vehicle
Air Pollution Control Act; the 1968 Aircraft Noise Abatement Act; the 1968 Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act and the 1968 National Trail System Act. These laws provided the rationale for later
creating the Environmental Protection Agency and the controversial Superfund that imposed
government financial penalties on polluters. However, Bernstein pointed out that during the latter
part of the decade, funding became a major problem because land prices, pushed up by the
inflation of the Vietnam War, were appreciating at a rate of ten percent a year. According to
Bernstein, by January, 1967 Udall informed the Bureau of the Budget that the shortfall for the
next decade could be $2.5 billion. Melosi further quoted Bernstein:
The overarching goal of the administration-if there was one--was to wed
concern over the environment to the larger goals of the (3-eat Society. This meant
identifying with continuing congressional efforts at environmental reform or
writing new legislation. These programs also fit the spirit of the Great Society and
firmly grounded the "New Conservation" in traditional conservation causes. 40
Udall said however that the Vietnam War and countless domestic programs such as Social
Security and civil rights consumed Johnson's time and his presidency. They rarely spoke.
"The very name "New Conservation" suggests a looking backward as well as a
looking ahead,'' wrote Melosi. "While environmental activity was vigorous, some
programs were merely extensions of Progressive Era or New Deal resource
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management; others were focused more clearly on anti-pollution and other quality
of life issues. In some cases the administration was a leader, in some a follower, in
others a usurper. Despite Udall's claim, the New Conservation was not a coherent,
consistent

Johnson's national economic woes had a tremendous impact on funding for projects such as the
Tocks Island Dam that had prohibitive cash flow problems to begin with. Cost estimates
continued to rise and topped out at more than $415 million when the project was finally deauthorized by Congress. Udall recalled working within the Johnson administration
"He (LBJ) was very good (prior to 1966) particularly before the budget crunch
got on. He wanted new programs," said Udall. "He wanted to be innovative. His
ideal was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He thought about the land a lot the way
Roosevelt did. Roosevelt was his idol and you could come up with a good idea
and (tell Johnson)"This is good for the land and good for the people," and he
bought it."42
On February 8th, 1965, LBJ conveyed a special messase on conservation and the
restoration of natural beauty, which exemplified his transitional "new conservationist" outlook,
to Congress. He proposed the establishment of twelve new national parks, including a park
surrounding the Tocks Island Reservoir, which would be created by damming the Delaware
River. At the same time Johnson announced he would soon be sending Congress a bill to
establish a national wild rivers system, "to identify and preserve free-flowing stretches of our
great scenic rivers before growth and development make the beauty of the unspoiled waterway a
memory," the President announced. "The full hnding of the Land and Water Conservation Fund
will be an important step in making this a Parks for America de~ade."~%eproposed using this
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fund to the acquire land needed to establish the Tocks Island National Recreation Area. So, at the
same time he proposed establishing national parks to preserve natural resources and a measure to
protect America's rivers, he was going to accomplish these innovations by building a dam on one
of the few remaining free-flowing rivers in the United States and creating a h n d that would be
used to displace thousands of home and landowners who were in the way. The dutihl Army
Corps of Engineers were given their marching orders. For several years this proposal received
sustaining support from a myriad of local representatives who believed their constituents might
somehow benefit from such a grandiose feat of modern engineering. In the same speech, LBJ
ironically said he would support the National Trust for Historic Preservation, chartered by
Congress in 1949, because citizens were rallying to save landmarks of beauty and history. LBJ
said he intended to propose legislation to authorize grants to help local authorities acquire,
develop and manage private historical properties and he called the Registry of National Historic
Landmarks, which received no federal hnding at all, "a fine program." One would have to
conclude that the historic landmarks and natural landscape of the Minisink Valley doomed to
become the bed of Tocks Lake did not fit into this cost-conscientious equation.

LBJ's Choice: Guns or Butter
and the Economic lmpact on Tocks Island Dam
Late in his life and well after he became a celebrated author and self-proclaimed
environmentalist, Stewart Udall wrote that damming the Delaware River "took on national
significance by becoming a struggle that dramatized the evolution of the environmental
movement in this c o ~ n t r ~For
. " Udall
~ ~ to have placed such historic significance on the proposed
dam and the key role he played in the creation of both the dam and surrounding national park is
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surprising given the fact that there are only a handful of documents pertaining to these projects in
Udall's personal papers housed at the University of Arizona. However, his statement helps to
better understand the main argument of this thesis--that construction of Tocks Island Dam was
not stopped simply because of growing concern for the environment or because growth of the
environmental movement itself empowered national leaders to adopt anti-dam or protective
policies for natural resources such as rivers. It was a complicated struggle that evolved over a
long period of time and was absorbed by the growing environmental movement later in the
1970s and 80s, but to better understand it's creation and collapse, it is necessary to place it
historically within the relevant political and economic framework of the Johnson presidency and
ask why this project was so important to so many people? How did American involvement in the
War in Vietnam, Johnson's domestic Great Society programs and the economy af'fect the demise
of Tocks Island dam?
In the introduction of The .Johnson Years, Volume Two: Yietmm, the Environment, and

Science, editor Robert Divine examined historian Larry Berman's revealing assessment of
Johnson's Vietnam policy, his fatehl 1965 decision to h l l y involve the United States in ground
fighting in South Vietnam and the flawed advisory process Johnson used to reach that decision.
Many historians had previously claimed LBJ waMed about Vietnam and was essentially talked
into involving the United States in full-fledged was. "Berman believes that LBJ never had any
intention of pulling out of Vietnam," and this advisory process was just a faqade to legitimize the
prearranged decision to escalate. There was "no fair weighing of the alternatives," wrote Divine.
Berman agreed and called Johnson a "master of consensus" engaged in a "delicate exercise of
political juggling."45 The advisory process was used "to legitimize a previously selected option
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by creating the illusion that other views were being

ons side red."^^ Many historians and

biographers agree the tragic and fatal misjudgment of Americanizing the Vietnam War was due
to LBJ's dedication to his Great Society legislation and programs, which marginally included
Tocks Island Dam. By the time the United States was fully engaged in the war, Congress had
already passed 36 major pieces of Great Society legislation, but another twenty-six, including the
immensely important Medicare and civil rights bills were still waiting. Divine said LBJ was both
reluctant to withdraw from Vietnam and unwilling to sacrifice his domestic reforms. Berman
concluded:
The result was inevitable: the Great Society would crumble and he would lose in
Vietnam. Johnson was the cause of his ultimate undoing; the master manipulator
had finally undertaken a political juggling act that was beyond even his great
ski11.~'
There are a number of critical examinations of LBJ that provide important insight into his
personal character and political motivations. Some historians, like Berman and David
Halberstam depicted LBJ to be an ambitious and immoral master of manipulation and deception,
concerned with securing his place in history by emulating his idol President Franklin Roosevelt.
Believing his Great Society programs to be an extension of the New Deal and motivated by his
insecure fear of criticism and his distrust of former Kennedy staffers, his need to implement
andlor outdo Kennedy policies and his well-known bitter relationship with Robert Kennedy,
some historians believe Johnson misjudged the need for American involvement in the war and
relied too heavily hawkish advisors. On the other hand, former deputy national security advisor
to LBJ, Francis Bator called Johnson a "formidable bargainer." Bator said LBJ's Vietnam policy
revolved around his domestic programs and legislation based on proposals from fourteen task
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forces the president had commissioned on education, the environment, poverty and the cities,
"the entire Great Society agenda-was

sitting on his desk and the cities were about to burn.'?48

While trying to juggle it all, including Civil Rights marches and riots, Bator said Johnson lost
credibility because he chose to partially disguise the Americanization of the war. He avoided
Senator Jacob Javits invitation to debate the war in the Senate. Historians Bator, Berrnan and
Halberstam agree Johnson sought to avoid a grand debate on Vietnam because he feared that it
would embolden political elements that would derail his legislative programs. Instead he
internalized and expanded the powers of the executive branch and did not ask for a declaration of
war. The Vietnam War deprived LBJ's domestic programs of money. Bator wrote there was
nothing that LBJ cared more about in July 1945 than completing and extending the old Roosevelt
New Deal programs that had stalled in 1938. Bator wrote:
He knew that an honest discussion of the (war) would provoke a coalition of
budget balancers and small-government Republicans, who balked at the high cost
of guns and butter, and Deep South senators, who were determined to block civil
rights legislation. And so, to avoid a Vietnam versus Great Society debate that
might destroy his social and civil rights legislation, Johnson sidled into war with
minimum hss, no prime time speech, no new resolution, no call-up of reserves,
no tax increase, no drumming up of support. No change in policy.49
To protect his dreams of social reform, Johnson paid the enormous price of marching into a war
he knew could not be won. He flatly turned down his Treasury Secretary's repeated
recommendations during 1966 and 1967 that he prevail on the House Ways and Means
Committee to pass the tax bill by calling it a "war tax"'"
Economic historian, Donald F. Kettl wrote that American involvement in Vietnam grew
rapidly after June 1965 and so did the cost of the war. He said Johnson however waited two
48
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years before submitting a plan to increase taxes to pay for it, and then waited another year to
implement the plan-stalling

almost to the end of his presidency. Johnson assured Congress that

the United States could afford both guns and butter
Time may require further sacrifices," Johnson acknowledged in his 1966 State of
the Union message, "and if it does, then we will make them. But we will not heed
those who would wring it from the hopes of the unfortunate here in a land of
plenty. I believe we can continue the Great Society while we fight in ~ i e t n a m . ~ '
It was a juggling act and Johnson simply did not have the revenue to pay for it all, including

expensive dam projects or other marginal social improvements he had slated as part of his Great
Society program.
Kettl recalled the 1972 Atlantic Monthly article by David Halberstam, "How the
Economy Went Haywire" and noted that Presidential advisor Bill Moyers called the delay in
seeking the tax increase, "the single most devastating decision in the Johnson administration"
that helped to undercut the base of his internal support, "a time when he lost control of the
administration, lost control of events," said Moyers. The three year delay in establishing a tax
increase to help pay for the war fieled economic growth and unprecedented inflation. "The
struggle over the tax surcharge was the keystone of Lyndon Johnson's trazedy," wrote ~ e t t 1 . ~ ~
Historians have long agreed Johnson believed that any tax increase would endanger his social
programs, prompting an anticipated conservative backlash against the Great Society. Johnson
was eager to minimize the fiscal burden of the war and protect the Great Society from
congressional antagonists. Several historians claim Johnson deliberately withheld cost estimates
of the war for a year to weaken the case for a tax increase. Kettl observed:
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Halberstam delivered a tough indictment: Johnson had lied to Congress, the
American public, and his own staff about the real costs of Vietnam. Johnson
sought, instead, guns and butter-heavy Vietnam spending, coupled with an
expansive Great Society. It was a living lie, which in the end created economic
chaos.s3
Julian E. Zelizer, a public affairs historian and economist, wrote that Congressman
Wilbur Mills, the powerfill Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and fiscal
conservative, believed the Revenue Act of 1964 which cut taxes would stimulate economic
growth and create full employment. Zelizer said Mills believed in reducing taxation instead of
increasing public spending to spur growth. Instead, the government continued to boost
consumption by spending billions on military operations, weapons manufacturing and military
bases. In 1965, while members of the Council of Economic Advisors pressed for tax increases,
Johnson was getting bad advice from Mills not to include the costs for the Vietnam War in the
budget and instead request a suppIementa1 appropriation to pay for it. Johnson feared the Great
Society would become a partisan target for those opposed to his expanded social programs. Kettl
said Johnson delayed any decision on a tax increase in 1965 then deliberately stalled from 1966
to 1968 as inflation replaced economic growth as the key issue at the top of the national political
agenda. The fiscal 1967 budget, announced in January 1966, underestimated defense
expenditures by sixteen percent, which had grown fiom $6 billion to $20.6 billion in just one
year. According to Kettl, this and subsequent defense budget under-estimates led to a
duplicitous image of Johnson. Inflation continued to mushroom and a minor tax increase at the
beginning of 1966 did little to stop the "hemorrhage of military ~ ~ e n d i n ~ . " ~ ~ o nhad
g rto
ess
appropriate more and more supplemental finds for Vietnam, $13.8 billion in the spring of 1966
and a huge $58 billion defense appropriation for fiscal year 1967. Kelt1 said Johnson asain
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rehsed to agree to a tax increase and ordered his staff to stop issuing any public statements about
the state of the economy and the need for tax revenue.55Halberstam said less than a handful in
Congress supported a possible tax increase anyway because Johnson consciously chose not to
disclose the real cost of the war. "It was an extraordinary bit of manipulation, the single most
irresponsible act by an American President," wrote ~alberstam.'"nstead, Federal Reserve
Chairman William McChesney Martin predicted he could curb inflation through tighter
monetary policies and higher interest rates, a weakening of the savings-and loan industry, the
municipal bond market and housing construction. Johnson unfortunately believed him.
In the fall of 1966 when Johnson's advisors began working on the next fiscal year
budget, they finally asreed there was a need for a tax increase. They called for immediate action
to reduce spending and to impose whatever tax measures necessary to pay for Vietnam. Johnson
reluctantly agreed with them and sent a special economic message to Congress announcing he
was imposing immediate spending cuts of $1.5 billion. At this point, things were not too bad.
The deficit for fiscal 1966 was less than $4 billion, but very soon the economy was out of
control. Budget deficits had grown to unprecedented levels and there were early signs of serious
balance of payments problems with foreign countries. Thorndike said Mills did not like the tax
surcharge and did not think it would pass Congress. He would only agree to any tax increase as
long as Johnson cut discretionary spending. In a July 19, 1967 memo, Califano fortuitously
warned the President that Mills was going to be a problem. The constitution requires all tax
nleasures originate in the House and House procedures required tax bills to originate in the Ways
and Means Committee. Mills effectively refksed to report the bill out of committee. Mills first
insisted Johnson cut $4 billion in expenditures and kept increasing that amount until after
55
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Johnson announced he would not seek re-election, when a new phase of negotiations with Mills
resulted in his demand for $5 billion in immediate cuts and $20 billion in cuts to fiture
appropriations "His position was Johnson would have to choose between guns and butter,"
urote Ketti. "Mills would move toward restraint, but he preferred cutting the Great Society
programs to increasing taxes."j7 KettI added that Budget Bureau studies showed the
administration could cut no more than $4 billion without deeply hurting the Great Society
Califano urged Johnson to fight Mills and Senate leaders circumvented Ways and Means by
attaching the surcharge to an innocuous Senate bill that Jolinson signed into law. It included
compromises that required $6 billion in immediate spending cuts and a fbture cut of $8 billion in
appropriations. This actually favored Mills in current spending cuts, but enabled the
administration to salvage $1 1 billion less in hture cuts than Mills had wanted, however these
cuts were unprecedented. "Congress for the first time in history, set a ceiling on federal
spending," according to Kettl. "Congress told the president how much to cut-but

not

here."^"

Years later, a reflective Johnson said he would not have changed his decision to
recommend guns and butter budgets to Congress, decisions Kettl wrote, "Were far more
complicated than the argument that Johnson lied to protect both Vietnam and the Gseat
Society "j7 white House economists underestimated the degree to which Vietnam was fueling
the economy in late 1965 and they overestimated the slowdown that occurred in late 1966 and
early 1967. The federal deficit grew rapidly from $3.8 billion in fiscal 1966 to $8.7 billion in
1967 and $25.2 billion 1968. Growth in spending for Vietnam greatly added to the deficit, but

increases in Great Society programs and the slowdown in the economy significantly caused it to
increase as well.
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Johnson's national economic woes had a tremendous impact on fwnding for projects such
as the Tocks Island Darn that had prohibitive cash flow problems to begin with. According to
Albert, the dam was in financial trouble almost as soon as it was authorized by Congress in 1962
when the original cost estimate was only $90 million. Cost estimates continued to rise and
topped out at more than $4 15 million when the project was initially scrapped in 1975. Albert
concluded:
The impact of the Vietnam War on Tocks fbnding was almost immediate. Just as
the dam was being funded, domestic spending programs were being cut. Inflation,
heated by the budget deficit began rising. Externally, the project was competing
for dollars that were being sent to fight Communism in Southeast Asia. During
the second half of the 1960s there just wasn't enough money in the federal
treasury to build grand dam projects in the Minisink Valley and also wage war.""
In 1966 The Army Corps received $1.2 million for Tocks for the fiscal year 1967 when
construction was supposed to begin; however, rising land acquisition prices caused major delays.
Udall recalled how difficult it became to find knding for land acquisition for national parks and
that the War in Vietnam put a major squeeze on his budget. His statement supports the theory
that a lack of finding stalled the entire Tocks Island Dam project.
"I would say the one really major disappointment to me was when the Vietnam
War really began to be felt, "said Udall. "The last three years were essentially
tightening down; slowing down programs and the expansion that we had
experienced previously was slowed down. I'd say through 1965 our budgets were
gr-owing and we were really thriving. Then it became a kind of hold-the-Iine
operation beginning in '66.7'61

Udall also had to contend with the Army Corps of Engineers, Congressional dam
builders. In an interview Udall discussed conflicts between the Department of the Interior and
the Army Corps of Engineers that continued to be a major problem as the 1960s progressed
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"The Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation arise out of the great momentum of the dam building
movement that began in the New Deal Days," said Udall. Presjdent Kennedy was in favor of
building dams and Johnson inherited many o f his programs including Tocks Island Dam
Whife many of Johnson's other domestic programs were sacrificed, the question-how

a

marginal program like the Tocks Island Dam and National Recreation Area managed to escape
the chopping block completely-remains

unanswered. One possible answer is given by historical

biographers who agree Johnson simply refksed to let go of anything and while he begrudgingly
allowed programs and projects to suffer severe budget cutbacks, he kept them alive hoping he
would find the funding t o later resurrect them. Secretary Udall suggested another explanation
might come from a close examination of who supported building dams like Tocks Island and
why. Udall concluded:
Thc Corps of Engineers-with thc authority they had-they were given a very broad
authority by Congress. Most Congressmen under the old pork barrel system, regarded this
as a beneficial thing, something good for the country and they'd go home with their
projects and feel that they brought the bacon home for the people . . . but increasingly
thcsc actlvitm came under question. Conservationists did not want dams in certain arcas.
So, we began confrontations with thcm. Congress began to put little amendments on bills
giving lnterior a right to review certain things. Tl~eCorps didn't like any of this. Their
Congressmen didn't either. . . I found myself as the decade wore on increasingly
questioning myself some of their major dam building projects that at the beginning of the
1960s had appeared to be a sort of sacred cow . . . usually, no one was supposed to have a
say about it evcept the conccmed Congressmen, the people in a given state and the Corps.
. but it wasn't casy and you had to fight them every step of thc way.b"
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CHAPTER m
Is it a Dam, a Lake or a Pork Barrel Park?
From the time preliminary plans for a dam on the Delaware River were first discussed,
there were organizations such as municipal utilities and unions, businesses, and private
individuals who all stood to make a good deal of money. These entities were not only banking on
the obvious sources of Tocks project revenuewater and hydro-electric power, but recognized
they could make a great deal of money in real estate brokering, building and construction and
owning businesses that would support the huge crowds of anticipated park tourists. These
entrepreneurs became the biggest supporters of Tocks TsIand Dam, not because they supported
dam building, but because they wanted the enormous man-made lake it would create surrounded
by one of the biggest national parks in the country. The federal government was providing them
an open opportunity to make money at tax payers' expense and they mustered all the political
support they could get. On the other hand, there were some long-time residents, like Nancy
Shukaitis, who despite knowing they were losing their homes or farms, remained stewards of the
Minisink Valley and hated to see the area fall prey to such commercial development. This
chapter will examine the underlying political "pork barrel" support for Tocks Island Dam, a
project that by all means should have never lingered into the 1970s once finds were cutback.
Definition of Pork Barrel Legislation: A political term in the post-Civil War
era. The term comes from the plantation practice of distributing rations of salt
pork to slaves from wooden barrels. When used to describe a bill, it implies that
the legislation is loaded with special projects for members of Congress to
distribute to their constituents back home at the cost of the federal taxpayer.G3
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Udall ironically told interviewers for the Presidency Project of the LBJ Library that the
early environmental movement suffered congestive problems at the national level especially
from lobbyists and powehl legislators from western states, who wanted to protect specific
industries such as mining and oil. This was ironic because UdalI was just as involved in
protecting special interests and returning favors to those who had helped him move key
legislation along.
The Wilderness Act signed by Johnson in 1964 was considered very controversial and
was heavily opposed by conservative Colorado Congressman Wayne Aspinall, longtime chair of
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and an adversary of the budding environmental
movement. Clearly protecting his constituents' interests, Aspinall fought nearly all legislation
and programs associated with Udall and the Department of the lnterior and called
environmentalists "over-indulged zealots" and "aristocrats" to whom "balance means nothing."
The controversial fight between the federal government and states over public lands in
the United States is a subject for inquiry and historic analysis by itself, but basically according to
Udall, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both attempted to encourage the right kinds of
development at the federal level and expand or limit the role of the federal government where it
was deemed necessary in particular states. "The attitude you got at the state level to too much a
degree was based on local pressures, local considerations, and it didn't always accord with the
best conservation practices and principles," said ~ d a l l . ~ % s ~ i n awould
ll
not let a bill leave "his"
committee unless he approved it and this particular fight was over states rights versus expanding
federal powers over land and the natural resources contained therein by allowing the Department
of the Interior to classify public lands and evolve management programs that had the potential to
be friendly or influential to certain industries or private interests. Aspinall either believed
64
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individual states should retain these responsibilities or he did not want any new federal
government agencies interfering or usurping control and backing special interest groups other
than those already in place. However a closer study shows that in this alleged east versus west
fight, Udall was just as interested in protecting the special interests of certain politicians
associated with Tocks Island, who could help him get other national legislation passed and win
his battles with Aspinall. Udall said he owed political favors.
Even though a President proposed it (legislation), a congressional committee
wouldn't even hold hearings for three years. That's the kind of opposition we had.
The device I used was to work with the (Interior and Insular Affairs) committee
members who were for it. And particularly Congressman Saylor of Pennsylvania
became one of the outstanding advocates. He just constantly kept the pressure on
Aspinall. . .so finally he yielded and he got some concessions on his mining phase
out. This was a kind of horse trading. I would work with Saylor and others on the
committee and they'd keep nagging at him.65
The Wilderness Bill, introduced by Hubert Humphrey in 1957, was violently opposed by
western politicians such as Aspinall and the debate over public lands dragged on until Johnson
finally was able to sign the bill in 1964, however as early as 1962, the New York 7i'mes reported
Udall had endorsed legislation to establish a national recreation area in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, surrounding the site of the Tocks Island Dam, which had already been authorized by
Congress. Under a new policy agreement between the Army Corps and the Interior Department's
Bureau of Reclamation, enough land was to be acquired around reservoir sites to provide for
public recreation areas. Udall claimed the proposed Delaware national park, with nine major
recreational sites, would benefit 65 million people. Early attempts at bills authorizing the Tocks
Recreation area were introduced via committee by Senator Clifford Case, (R-NJ), Rep. Frank
Thon~pson(D-4th District-NJ) and Harrison Williams, (D-NS) These early attempts died in
committee, mostly due to Aspinall, but in 1964, coincidentally, the same year the Wilderness Bill
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became law, legislation was re-endorsed with renewed vigor by New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller and other members of the Delaware River Basin Commission: Governors Richard
Hughes of New Jersey; William Scranton of Pennsylvania; and Elbert Carve1 of Delaware.
Rockefeller's public endorsement was announced at the same time he was elected to replace
Udall as chairman of the DRBC. Cleverly once this battle appeared to be drawn at the state level
with Udall and the Department of Interior fading into the background, Rockefeller along with
others who had powefil eastern state-based political interests, including the Kennedys, upstaged
Aspinall. The new national recreation area, awaiting Congressional approval, would need to add
another $37 million in land acquisition costs to the $95 million needed to build the dam. With
necessary funding and political support believed to be in place, Col. E.P. Yates of the Corps of
Engineers predicted that Tocks Island Dam would be completed as early as 1972, however, as
discussed previously, finding the war in Vietnam caused budget cutbacks that forestalled this
process.66
Roger Kennedy, (no relation to JFK) director of the National Parks in the 1990's said
Udall pushed to create similar parks on the Jersey Shore and Cape Cod in order to stop
development, but instead these "parks have become beacons for lucrative tourism." Kennedy
said Udall used his political acumen and political allies well and understood that "public lands
like parks enhanced the economic value of privately held land nearby."" 1n 1962 Udall told
William Blair of the New York Times, that if "you asked the President (Kennedy) to single out
the five or six most important things, he would name this (Tocks IsIand Dam) as one. Gong-ess
should not get bogged down in the argument over the need for comprehensive water resources
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planning," said ~ d a 1 1And
. ~ ~he was right; the need for creating a water resource was hardly the
issue at all, just one of many thinly veiled selling points used by those who had much more to
gain by the creation of this proposed dam and park.
During his battles with Aspinall and debates over the fbture of public lands Udall had
formed an alliance with Congressman John Saylor, 22nd District of Pennsylvania, who sat on the
Interior and Insular Affairs and Veterans Committees and the following subcommittees.
Territorial and lnsiilar Affairs, Irrigation and Reclamation, Public Lands, Indian Affairs, Mines
and Mining and National Parks Saylor and Udall had a lot of common interests including Tocks
Island. Evidence of massive lobbying efforts are contained in Saylor's personal papers on Tocks
Island Dam and newspaper clips housed at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Surprisingly,
there are very few articles or papers in the libraries of number of prominent politicians who were
closely associated with Tocks Island, including Louisiana Senator Allen Ellander, Chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne and Secretary
Udall. However, the papers of Congressman Saylor contained hundreds of letters of
correspondence concerning Tocks Island mostly from the Water Resources Association of the
Delaware River Basin, (WRA-DRB or simply WRA) an organization that claimed to represent
more than 500 supporters of the dam and the national recreational park, and its off-shoot
organization the Tocks Island Regional Advisory Council.
Still in existence today, the WRA was established in 1959 as a non-profit and selfproclaimed non-partisan advocacy group to promote "sound water resource nianasement in the
Delaware River Basin." Back then, the group was composed of mostly private businessmen,
some water, power and utility companies, sewage companies and government and municipal
agencies. There were no environmental interests represented in this organization that claimed
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they helped to establish the Delaware River Basin

om mission.^^ Leaders and members of the

WRA emphatically endorsed the dam and the park, distributed pricey color pamphlets and
brochures, made speeches, held conferences and conducted publicity campaigns, issued press
releases to the media and made a documentary film that called for united lobbying efforts to
persuade Congress to act on the dam's constr~ction.~~
The WRA, later headed by President
Frank Dressler, really represented many organizations and people who stood to benefit from the
Tocks project including the vacation resort industry, unions and other labor groups, builders,
land speculators, private utilities, economic development organizations and members of various
Chambers of Commerce and land speculators.
The WRA had conducted their own impact studies on employment, income levels and the
tax base for the five counties to be involved in the recreation area and members were fully aware
of who stood to benefit and kept pushing for enactment of the bill. Dressler offered federal
authorities assistance in assessing changes in land use, transportation, utilities and other public
services and how to cope with any other anticipated problems resulting from the Tocks Island
Recreational Area. Dressler indicated the WRA would volunteer to act as a liaison inter-agency
committee to keep local governments informed and as an advisory liaison between the Army
Corps of Engineers and the National Park Service. He even wrote to Aspinall urging him to
change federal policies regarding federal reimbursement of temporary lost tax ratables to
counties and municipalities during the land acquisition process. He urgently lobbied Saylor and
other representatives to have the recreation area created as expeditiously as possible. "Land
values in the region are rising so sharply that if action is deferred on the authorization bilI until
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an impact study is completed and all problems are carefblly considered, there may be no action
on the recreation bill at all," wrote ~ r e s s l e r . ~ '
Another effect the War in Vietnam had on the demise of Tocks Island was giving
property owners and real estate investors time to speculate on land and escalate the prices of
property everyone knew the government would need to buy. Land acquisition for the national
park did not begin until 1967 and there were funding problems almost as soon as it was
authorized. "The recreation area was affected by cutbacks due to the Vietnam War, but to a
lesser extent than the dam project. The price for land was the major dollar problem for the
National Park Service, " wrote ~ l b e r tThe
. ~ agency
~
had been given only $3 7.5 million to
purchase 47,675 acres of land and the price kept escalating. The price of real estate, both inside
and on the outskirts of the site doubled and sometimes tripled as early as 1965, according to local
news articles. One real estate salesman told the Pocono Record his firm had received hundreds of
calls and visits from large investors in both New York and Philadelphia. At that time, the Army
Corps estimated it would need to acquire nearly 50,000 acres of land on both sides of the
Delaware. "Owners within the dam area are placing high and often unreasonable price tags on
properties because they think the government will pay. Owners see this as a way out," wrote the
unidentified salesman. He said speculators were willing to invest large amounts of money for
land even though the exact boundaries of the recreation area had not yet been determined.
Another ad in the Wall Sl~.ee/Jownal offered 625 choice acres on the Delaware River for sale.
"This offering is particularly attractive because of i t s involvement in the scheduled establishment
of a thirty-seven mile lake and the National Park surrounding the lake-already

approved by

Congress." Lewis and Haring Realtors in Newton,
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New Jersey claimed the property had "built-in value for any negotiations with the governmentcondemnation is scheduled within three to four

The Newark Szmdqv News ran ads

offering summer homes for only $3,495 or lots were offered for $279, requiring a down payment
of only $1 5 and $5 payments per month at Blue Mountain Lakes, within the boundaries of the
recreation area. "Persons purchasing land now may expect to earn a profit between their purchase
price and the fair market value which the Government must pay at the time of acquisition," the
ad proclaimed.7"
One of the largest slated developments was Hidden Lake in Monroe County, PA within
the park's proposed boundaries and only two miles from Tocks Island itself. This picturesque 390
acre private vacation community surrounding its own 40 acre lake was being priced beyond any
possibility of public use and the owners, Western Heritage Properties, Ltd., a Toronto
corporation, were being protected because the president of WRA at the time, prior to Dressler

was Charles R. Bensinger, a Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania attorney, who sat on the development
corporation's board of directors. It had sold twice within one year, doubling in price the second
time. A neighbor and later ardent leader of the anti-Tocks movement, Nancy Shukaitis, publicly
accused Bensinger of conflict of interest during her testimony to the House Subcommittee on
National Parks on June 9, 1964. Apparently the Board of Directors or Western Heritage thought
it would be advantageous to have a resident of the Poconos region who was thoroughly familiar
with the area, on their board. Bensinger was already the corporate local counsel and a
stockholder before elected to the board in 1963. Saylor reacted by saying he would look into the
matter, while Bensinger quietly resigned.
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Also in 1964 the WM-DRB produced and distributed a slick and expensive, full-color
pamphlet entitled Tocks Island and Outdoor Recreatinrl.for ihe Crowded East that urged readers
to contact members of Congress to support the recreation area. The intended audience was
special interest groups associated with the vacation-resort industry, labor unions, government
builders and economic development organizations. In 1965, the National Park Service published
that was paid
an identical pamphlet entit led Tocks Z s h d Nntiotml Recreation Area--A Pro~~osnl,
for by the WRA-DRB, who helped distribute 25,000 copies. These pamphlets infuriated local
residents. Again, activist Shukaitis testified.
These persons (Delaware Valley homeowners) do not have a public relations
group or lobbyists to front for them and are no competition for the interests of
water for basin industry, proponents who want a fast return on their developer
dollar. This brochure doesn't even mention that anyone lives in the project area.
In the past few years land speculation has moved so rapidly, so lavishly and with
such confidence of this bill's passage that it warrants a full-scale investigation. Of
course it is difficult to uncover straw buyers and fictitious names, but the makeup
of new corporations would be most revealingS7j
Ironically, Bensinger himself had also warned the federal government to move quickly on
the Tocks Island Iand acquisition because the costs of buying land would rise due to real estate
developers. "The speculators probably have contacts within the government and have inside
information," said ~ e n s i n ~ e rOne
. ~ ' such specific government connection was between Dressler,
Saylor and Udall. In a letter dated Sept. 14, 1966, in which Dressler casually addressed Saylor as
"Dear John," he asked SayIor to keep Udall to his promise of providing $15 million that year for
land acquisition. In another of his many letters, Dressler proksely thanked Saylor for everything
he had done to facilitate the authorization and knding of Tocks Island Dam and the Delaware
-
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Water Gap National Recreation Area. "We of course look forward to working with you until the
day these vitally important projects have been completely developed," wrote Dressler. Saylor
replied on December 8th, 1966. Saylor warned Dressler that he now had to get bonding bills
approved for hnding because of federal spending cut backs.
To be clear, the dam and the national park represented two different and separate
projects, two separate acts of legislation and two filnding revenue streams with attached budgets
that each needed congressionally approved appropriations. Tocks Island National Recreation
Area legislation was introduced in early 1965 by Saylor, who at the time was the ranking
minority leader of the House Interior Committee. Udall wrote a letter to Aspinall requesting his
views on this legislation, HR 89, to establish the Tocks Island National Recreation Area, (the
name was later changed to the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area) and strongly
recommended enactment. "The Tocks Island Dam will create a sizable reservoir of good quality
water, the recreational values of which wiI1 be exceptionally high," wrote UdalI. He told Aspinall
the multi-purpose reservoir, which would account for 14,800 acres of the 71,975 acre park,
would become one of the most significant areas of water-based recreation in the eastern United

Pennsylvania Congressman Richard Schweiker supported the national park because
recreation was his state's number one growth industry with nearly one billion a year in revenues,
but relative to its potential, it remained his state's most undeveloped industry. There was
tremendous support for H.R. 89 and President Johnson signed the bill creating the national park
into law on September 1"' 1965. It gave the Secretary of Interior $37.4 million to acquire an
additional 47,675 acres of land and $18.2 million for recreational faciIities, which were to
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include thirty-one separate development sites, 11,000 picnic tables, 6,500 camp sites, 135 boat
launches, 1,860 boat docks, 33,000 parking spaces, 15 food service areas and beaches for 66,000
people divided into nine beach areas. There were also going to be facilities for camping, boat
rentals, hiking and biking trails, horseback riding, picnicking, hunting, fishing, sailing, motor
boating, canoeing, rock climbing, winter sports, nature centers, playgrounds, ball fields, historic
sites, interpretive facilities and the dam itself. All of this for an expected 150,000 people per
day-making

this the busiest park in the United States. Even after LBJ signed the bill, Dressler

wrote to Udatl urging him to begin the project as rapidly as possible and again, he copied Saylor.
Udall still had to contend with the Army Corps of Engineers, the congressional dam
builders. In an interview Udall discussed conflicts between the Department of the Interior and
the Army Corps that continued to be a major problem as the 60s progressed. "The Corps and the
Bureau of Reclamation arise out of the great momentum of the dam building movement that
" ~ ' said Kennedy was in favor of building dams and Johnson
began in the New Deal ~ a ~ s . Udall
inherited many of his programs including Tocks Island Dam. Udall learned about "pork barrel
legislation" quickly.
One of many strong proponents of the "guns or butter" theory, historian Irving Bernstein
agreed Udall himself was an "old school" conservationist, who continued to promote traditional
programs and expand the national park system and public lands program despite rumblings from
those who wanted a more aggressive and progressive environmental agenda. Instead, Bernstein
said Udall's agenda included making the western-oriented Department of Interior more national
in scope by creating new national parks in the East that would provide outdoor recreation to
crowded cities and suburbs. In a July 27, 1963 newspaper article in the Getty~b~trg
T/mes, Udall
was quoted as saying he felt "Tocks Island Park was overdue" and called the dam "one of the top
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Udall Interview V, p. 10

53

projects of the Delaware River Basin Commission." He predicted ground would be broken
within the next fifieen months and that the project would be completed prior to 1970.
Udall was apparently very mindhl of the political "pork barrel" interests involved in
Tocks Island dam and local constituents who stood to make a good deal of money from this new
national park located within 100 miles of the nation's greatest population concentration. He
predicted that the area would be visited by more than six million people annually. Another
politician who supported the project fi-om its inception (during the Kennedy administration) was
Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ) who had a history of supporting pork barrel type legislation
From this perspective, the Tocks Island Dam and Delaware National Park were hardly
environmental controversies at all. The real fight (over the federal government building a manmade recreational lake with a national park protecting and surrounding it) was between those
who stood to benefit from the millions of people expected to visit it annually and local residents,
even those losing their homes, who did not want to see rural New Jersey and Pennsylvania overdeveloped and crowded with park goers. It was a classic case of "not in my backyard," or

NIMBY. For those who were adamantly against building this project early-on, environmental
concerns were not that important.
Also adding to the dam building turmoil during Johnson's administration were several
attempts to consolidate various depadments especially through the 1 964 Task Force on
Government Organization, chaired by Donald K. Price, who recommended creating a new
Department of Natural Resources. Favored by Udall, this would have merged the Departments of
Interior, Agriculture, Forest Service and Soil Conservation, along with the Army Corps of
Engineers. Water resource fbnctions were to go to the Federal Power Commission. The Army
Corps favored keeping the status quo as a way of protecting its monopoly over dozens of public

works projects. In addition, because there was so much money involved, the Bureau of the
Budget argued against allowing this new and potentially powerfiil merged department the ability
to coordinate and plan functions that Congress had assigned to the Water Resources Council
through the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965. These reorganization attempts went nowhere
and demonstrated how much inter-agency territorial rivalry existed and the arms-length
relationship between the Army Corps and the Department of the Interior. The development of
programs took priority over making comprehensive environmental policy because programs
could be controlled by agencies, whereas policies could not be. Udall believed a new and
powerfid environmental department could have been established then had Johnson supported it,
but "Johnson was too much the politician to be caught up in such a web," wrote Albert. 79
"The naturalistic park and Tocks Island Dam were pipe dreams," wrote Albert.
"By all rights a host of dignitaries should have descended on the Minisink in 1967
and, grasping ribbon-bedecked shovels, turned over the first soil." No ceremony
ever took place. "Try as they might the Corps of Engineers could not get
construction started in the turbulent decade of the 1960s."~"
This directly supports the argument that time and money were the most significant factors
affecting the demise of the Tocks Island Dam. Had the first shovel of soil been turned in 1967,
the project might have moved ahead. An examination of LBJ's federal budgets and subsequent
allocations indicates projects that were already started, continued to receive more hnding than
those that had not. During this critical window of time, prior to the end of the LBJ presidency, a

continued reduction of funding due to inflation and spending for the Vietnam War coupled with
skyrocketing project costs, made Tocks Island Dam a low fbnding priority and continuously
stalled project . While he worked for a non-profit environmental organization that clearly
claimed Tocks was stopped by the environmental movement, Albert briefly mentioned the War
79
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in Vietnam and a lack of funding several times in his book, but did not develop this aspect
further. "It was cold, hard cash, or the lack of it rather, that kept dam building from occurring,"
wrote Albert. "Tocks Island Dam had a tremendous cash-flow problem . . . the project was
competing for dollars that were being sent to fight Communism in Southeast ~ s i a . " "
During the second half of the 1960's there just wasn't enough money in the federal
treasury to build grand dam projects and wage war, according to Albert, who said Tocks Island
Dam was in serious financial trouble even as Congress authorized the project in 1962. Costs
turned out to be extremely underestimated. Originally the price tag was a little more than $90
million and increased to $95 million by the time Congress appropriated the first finds because of
inflation. As planning actually got underway, the cost estimates rose significantly. Changes in
dam design due to geological problems added an additional $16 million before July, 1965 and
the need for protective works in the upper part of the reservoir pool added another $14 million.
Estimates to relocate cemeteries, schools, highways and power lines proved inadequate and
added another $12 million to the pro-ject, increased cost of land acquisition added another $15
million and more money to purchase land for wildlife migration measures added $8 million.

By July, 1967 the estimated cost of Tocks Island Dam was $198 million-a tremendous $100
million increase in less than three years, which may not seem like much money by today's
standards, but then it had a very negative impact on Congress. In the House, the Public Works
Committee ordered a staff study of the project's benefit cost ratio, which was never made public,
according to Albert, but was leaked to the Pocn~oRecord on March 2 1, 1968. The report
allegedly found the cost benefit ratio had fallen to below the 1.4 or 1.5 the Army Corps
maintained. No one had previously taken into account $4 million in estimated damages to the
Delaware Bay's oyster industry. The Army Corps disputed these findings and the project
lbid
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survived temporarily until its costs again were questioned by Senator Allen Ellander (D-La.),
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works and in the House by Public Works
Chairman, Michael Kinvan @-Ohio) "Even Congress, which usually favored expensive porkbarrel projects, was beginning to wonder ifthe country could afford a costly project like Tocks,"
wrote Albert. "Tocks Island Dam was beginning to get a reputation as a bottomless pit for federal
appropriations." 82

The results of this public notoriety during a time of serious inflation and budget crisis
spending during the Vietnam War resulted in two scathing full page editorials in Time Magazine
that specifically recommended cutting expenditures for unnecessary projects such as Tocks
Island Dam. The first anonymous editorial was published August 4th, 1967. Entitled "Congress:

Where Charily Beg~ns"criticized the House for recentIy passing a $4.6 billion public works
appropriation bill. "$2 billion of which is pork. . .including such frills as the Delaware River-

Tocks Island reservoir and recreational program at the New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania
border, which was supposed to cost $90.4 million but has since grown to a tidy little $198
million affair." 83 The author had obviously studied the 478 page federal budget, which was the
subject of national debate and confusion. "Practically everyone agrees the federal budget is
bloated, but practically nobody can agree on just where to cut. The issue will profoundly affect
elections, prices and everyone's pocketbook in 1968 and beyond," the article stated. The author
pointed out the ongoing debate about national goals and priorities and which ones the United
States should find. Congress had already cut appropriations by $4.5 billion and LBJ, under
pressure fiom Congress, offered a fbrther cut of $2.6 billion by paring 10 % from outlays for
controllable programs and 2% from personnel costs. Even with these cuts, federal spending was

"'1
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expected to climb to $136 billion while the deficit was close to $20 billion, the highest since the
World War I1 era. Prices were rising and the dollar was debilitated.
The second article contained derisive suggestions on how Washington should cut federal
spending on unnecessary programs such as Tocks Island

am.'^

he author suggested that

Congress and the president should ask three questions about every major item of expense: Is the
expense necessary for national security? Would a postponement of the program lead to a much
greater costs in the future? Will this expense improve the lives of most Americans? The author
recommended not cutting hnding for education, foreign relations, or poverty progranls, but felt
cuts should be made to agriculture and defense. "Without slackening the Vietnam War effort
now costing $30 billion a year, the US can substantially reduce its $74.5 billion defense budget
by slowing military construction, bringing home troops from Korea and Europe and reducing
foreign military aid." Other areas where the Time article recommended the government cut
spending included the space program, seaways, airways and public works. Albert wrote:
The rich aroma of pork converts even the most ardent budget cutters into big
spenders. The $4.6 billion public works bill for fiscal 1968 was approved, but
high on Times recommended hit list for funding cuts was the non-essential and
increasingly expensive Delaware River-Tocks park.x5

Rising costs immediately resulted in a slow-down of the project. During hearings in March 1968,
after Senator Ellender publicly questioned the cost benefit ratio of the dam projected at around
1.4, the General Accounting Office (GAO) studied the project and determined that recreational

benefits had been overstated by $8 million, while water supply benefits were understated by $21
million. This meant that the water supply accounted for more than 30 percent of the total costs
-
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and the Water Supply Act of 1958 required the Army Corps to have contracts for the sale of
water in excess of 30 percent prior to construction. Ellender's reaction to this report was to insist
that the Senate Appropriation Committee report contain criticism of the way Tocks Island
benefits were being calculated by the Army Corps. In 1969 hnding for the dam was not only cut
back, but delayed for the first time. Although the GAO did not sound an alarm over the overall

benefit-cost ratio, concern over the allocation of benefits, coupled with an austere budget that
provided the Philadelphia District with only about $2 million in fiscal year 1969 for construction
purposes, meant that by the dawn of the 1970s, the Corps had not yet begun constructio:: of the
dam.

CHAPTER IV

Nix on Tocks: The Environmental Demise of the Dam? The 1970s and Beyond

As the turbulent decade of the sixties came to a close and President Johnson refixed to
run for another term, Richard M. Nixon came into ofice leading the populist "silent majority" in
his fhtile attempt to re-establish domestic tranquility. The War in Vietnam dragged on, the
economy continued to suffer and no contracts had been forged for the construction of Tocks
Island Dam. Sixties protesters of every kind formed a natural alliance with ecologists as the
environment slowly became a national issue. Americans now concerned with preservation not
conservation, began to attract attention and influence the country's lawmakers. Had Tocks Island
Dam been fbnded and construction started during the Johnson administration prior to the
seventies, it might have slipped past new regulatory environmental legislation, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which required the Army Corps to hrnish an environmental
impact statement. It might have not have attracted the attention of national environmental groups
who were joining displaced residents to fight the dam. Again, it was an issue of time created by a
lack of funding due to the war. Those who strongly felt this impact statement led to the
"environmental demise" of Tocks Island may not have been aware that the key players, members
of the Delaware River Basin Commission, who voted against the dam in 1975, did not
necessarily do so for environmental reasons. It was really an issue of money.

Sunfish Pond: An Environmental Caveat
A separate, but related part of the proposed Tocks Island Dam Project was the Kittatinny
Mountain Project, which called for the construction of a pumped, water-storage system on top of
a high ridge of the Appalachians that border the Delaware River on the New Jersey side. The
land, which included the scenic, but sterile forty-acre Sunfish Pond, had been part of the original
Worthington Estate, sold to Governor Robert Meyner and the State of New Jersey in 1954. It
remains part of Worthington State Forest.
In 1956, studies were conducted by Public Service Gas and Electric, Jersey Central
Power and Light and New Jersey Poser and Light Companies to examine Kittatinny Ridge as a
pumped storage site. During off-peak hours, power companies would pump water from a lower
reservoir (Tocks) to a higher one and when power demands were high, the water would be
returned to the lower reservoir to generate electricity. The three power companies purchased a
785 acre portion of the Worthington property, including Sunfish Pond, fiom the state in 1961 and

obtained permits fiom the Federal Power Commission. Their plans called for three reservoirs to
be build on top of Kittatinny Mountain and the destruction of Sunfish Pond. Afler completing
one phase of the project at Yards Creek, the other two planned reservoirs stalled because the
DRBC now wanted rent money for use of water coming from Tocks Island Reservoir and also
insisted the power companies help pay for part of the dam itself.
Two nearby residents, Casey Kays, an avid hiker, and Glenn Fisher, a former United
States Department of Agriculture employee, began a grassroots letter-writing campaign to save
Sunfish Pond. Their efforts gained local media attention and support. Former New Jersey
Governor Thomas Kean, at the time, junior assemblyman elected in 1967, became involved in
this grassroots movement to save Sun Fish Pond fiom becoming the site of a pumped water

storage facility. Kean, who then considered himself a conservationist, said he repeatedly
submitted his bill to the New Jersey Assembly to save the site because "it was one of the few
glacial lakes we have in New Jersey and we were losing too many of our scenic areas." Although
Sun Fish Pond was saved, Kean's bill never gained any traction and his fellow New Jersey
legislators jokingly called him "a bird watcher." "I didn't understand why I had three governors,
the Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO and everybody else against me all of a sudden because
of this little bill to save a small pond," recalled Kean. The pumped storage facility at Sun Fish
Pond would have created valuable hydroelectric power and was slated to be one of the
commercial components of the overall dam project used to financially justify it.
"It became evident to me fairly soon that what I was fighting was the entire
(Tocks Island) project and not just Sunfish Pond," said Kean. "I made it my prime
cause and the more they opposed me, the more irritated and angrier I became and
the harder I worked on it. Everybody was for it. All the governors were for it as
well as all of the economic bosses. So people assumed it was going to happen and
I was a fly in the ointment. They tried everything they could to get me to back off
They even threatened my campaign contributions at one point."86
The climax of grass roots publicity efforts to save Sunfish Pond came when United States
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas joined a pilgrimage protest hike to the Pond on June
17, 1967. "I wish to identifl myself strongly with this cause. Sunfish Pond is a unique spot and
deserves to be preserved," said ~ o u ~ l a87 s .

Albert noted that in 1968, a compromise between the DRBC and the power companies
was reached. The state gave the utility companies one hundred acres of nearby land in a trade for
Sunfish Pond and promises to landscape the unsightly upper reservoir dikes and hide all
penstocks, generating plants and transmission lines so they could not be seen from Tocks Island
Lake and the recreational area below. By June 1970, Congress had authorized pumped storage
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power as a part of the Tocks Island Dam Project and the grassroots campaign to save Sunfish
Pond had attracted the attention of those who wanted to stop Tocks Island Dam.
"As early as 1968, Glenn Fisher and others were writing letters talking not only
about the potential harm to the pond, but also about the loss of the free-flowing
Delaware River, the loss of river bottomlands, the impact on ecology, water
quality and other issues, " wrote Albert. "These were impacts anticipated from the
construction of Tocks Island Dam and not fiom the pumped storage faci~ities."~~
The controversy over Sunfish Pond in the mid 1960s had attracted public attention to the
proposed Tocks Island Dam and National Park on the Delaware at the same time the
environmental movement was just starting to gain national momentum, but any significant
environmental opposition to the dam did not start until after 1970 mostly because the recreation
area appealed to many traditional dam opponents and environmental causes in general had not
gained widespread interest until after the first Earth Day in April of that year. Early resistance
came fiom groups like the Delaware Valley Conservation Association, opposed to the national
recreation area and the Save the Delaware Coalition, who were against the dam, but favored the
recreation area despite the fact that it tripled the amount of private land to be taken by the
government. In the next few years every possible environmental issue was subsequently raised,
but despite these real or imagined later environmental impacts, the dam remained a victim of the
Vietnam War, cost overruns and poor planning. Prices for land acquisition, geological site
problems, cemetery and grave re-location and other costs had escalated or were unanticipated.
The biggest opponents remained the doomed residents.
Nancy Shukaitis, whose family had lived in the Minisink for generations, became the
first local resident to oppose the dam when she testified alone during a 1964 Congressional
hearing in Philadelphia. A natural leader and activist, she was later elected as a Monroe County
Commissioner (freeholder) in 1967, a post she held for the next sixteen years, indicating
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significant local support for her anti-dam agenda and fight against the federal government.
Regional support for the dam began to erode and the Army Corps of Engineers became the local,
on-site enemy. Albert wrote:
Because of the delay in the start of construction, Tocks Island Dam got caught in
a cross fire. Public interest in preserving the environment had been increasing . .
By the 1970s, Tocks Island Dam would have been scrutinized closely by the
environmentalists, if for no other reason than its sponsor was the hated United
States Army Corps of ~ n ~ i n e e r s . ' ~

Chickens and Traffic Jam the Dam

The lack of hnding in the 1960s due to Vietnam War federal spending cutbacks became
a real issue for the dam as costs escalated. During the 1970s it came under increasing fire and
proponents were forced to head off more and more obstacles. As the seventies progressed, the
two biggest concerns were diminished cost benefits and newly exposed environmental impacts.
There were major concerns over limited recreational use of the reservoir because new
engineering studies revealed that during times of drawdown, (which is the partial draining of the
reservoir during times of low water flow or drought, especially during hot summer months) vast
unsightly mudflats would grow along the lakeshore. A few years later other environmental
impact studies indicated algae fed by phosphorescent groundwater runoff from nearby New York
State chicken and dairy farms into the stagnant reservoir water would cause it to become a
eutrophic gigantic cesspool unfit for recreation, which was supposed to make up 5 1 percent of
the projects' congressionally mandated income benefit. New York State rehsed to absorb the
cost of building expensive treatment facilities to control the agricultural ground water runoff
coming from upstate New York.
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In 1970, the DRBC commissioned its first environmental study of the project area,
completed by Roy F. Weston, Inc. This initial environmental and engineering study made
various recommendations to ensure the reservoir provided sufficient water supply, a sewage plan
centrally administered by the DRBC, and engineering studies on solid waste disposal be
conducted. Armed with the results of this environmental study, which was a relatively new field
at the time, the Corps and dam supporters staunchly maintained the dam was still a workable
project.g0 However, that year the dam supporters met their biggest obstacle. Even though Tocks
Island Dam had been authorized before passage of the Nztional Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), the Army Corps was now required to produce an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) before any construction could begin. The EIS was to be prepared according to newly
established guidelines set by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). In all fairness to the
Corps, the CEQ guidelines were ambiguous and untested. In 1971, the Corps submitted a very
short preliminary statement that outraged opponents and legislators alike. Although a more
comprehensive report was already in the works, the Corps' initial and hurried short statement
ignored environmental concerns, which raised suspicions. The CEQ countered by demanding the
Corps address specific issues that included: water quality and potential eutrophication;
alternatives to the dam; impacts on fish habitats in the Delaware; secondary costs and benefits,
land use control and the impacts of seasonal fluctuations in reservoir levels. The CEQ
recommended that construction of the Tocks Island Dam be delayed in the spring of 197lgiving
the Corps time to satisfactorily address these issues.

90 Delaware River Basin Commission, "Summary of Report on the Tocks Island Region Environmental Study," 16
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In October 1971, the Corps issued its final EIS on the dam which determined that
eventual eutrophication of the reservoir was likely because of sewage and animal waste runoff
from upstream chicken farms in New York and again recommended a large wastewater treatment
system was the solution. This more comprehensive one-hundred page long environmental impact
report identified many other adverse impacts from the dam, the recreation area and the pumped
storage project. Those impacts included: traffic jams; waste disposal and sewage treatment;
adverse impacts on the fish population; exposure of mudflats during reservoir drawdowns; loss
of agricultural lands and historic landmarks; the loss of historic Old Mine Road and the
Pahaquarry Copper Mine; loss of wildlife and natural habitat andthe hardships imposed on
current residents about to lose their homes. In February 1972, the Environmental Defense Fund
published its own evaluation of the Tocks Island Project. This document admitted that
"legitimate needs for water supply, flood damage prevention, outdoor recreation, and peaking
power exist in the Delaware River Basin," but it disputed that Tocks Island Dam was the best
way to meet these needs. The report criticized the Corps' calculations and studies of the Tocks
Island Reservoir water supply hnction as inadequate and misleading and claimed the Corps
overestimated the recreational benefits of the dam. In terms of flood control, the report stated
that, instead of constructir~ga large dam, the DRBC should use floodplain management to reduce
flooding risks at various tributary points. Finally, the report declared that "accelerated cultural
eutrophication would have serious detrimental effects on the use of Tocks Island Reservoir for
water supply and recreation" and insisted that the Corps require the DRl3C "to implement an
adequate waste water treatment and control program for both point (municipal and industrial)
and nonpoint (agricultural) waste water sources" before beginning constru~tion.~~
Russell Train,
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chairman of the CEQ, agreed with many of these criticisms and approached the governors of
New York and other states in the Delaware River Basin to receive assurances that New York
would take measures to prevent nutrient runoff into the reservoir and that Delaware,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey would provide fimding for a wastewater treatment system. When
these assurances were not forthcoming, Congress officially stopped the construction of Tocks
Island Dam in the summer of 1972. The Corps had been ready to advertise for construction bids,
but these issues jeopardized the Corps' continued funding. In June of 1973, both the House and
the Senate approved a $14.8 million appropriation, but stipulated it was to be used for property
acquisition only and not construction.

Governor Cabill's Roadblock
Governor William Cahill, who had supported the dam at one time, announced New
Jersey was going to re-evaluate its support for the project through a team at the state's newly
created Department of Environmental Protection, headed by Commissioner Richard J. Sullivan
and aided by Assistant Thomas M. O'Neill. Sullivan's team reviewed the costs and benefits to
New Jersey separately and the possibility of New Jersey withdrawing its support loomed. Based
on their report and recognizing the flood control benefit and additional water the dam could
provide, Cahill told fellow members of the DRBC that New Jersey would not oppose the dam,
but he insisted certain conditions be met before any construction started. "I did not condemn the
dam," said Cahill. "We should identify as accurately as possible all elements of the project,
including those things which indirectly will accompany it. . . we have not adequately carried out
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this assignment in three areas."92 Cahill felt those three critical areas were the impact on land
use of the dam and recreational area and the supplemental facilities needed; the cost,
appropriateness, and environmental impact of proposed regional sewerage facilities and the
highway system needed to serve the estimated number of annual visitors, which was 10.5
million.
Cahill was concerned about over-development of the areas surrounding the proposed park
and the glut of restaurants, stores, gas stations and hotels that would spring up, especially in
northwestern New Jersey. "Officials of these communities expressed to me their urgent concern
about the costs of more hospital rooms and service, ambulances, police and fire protection and
the upgrading of municipal and county roads," said Cahill. "The Tocks Island region of Warren
and Sussex Counties will experience severe pressures for commercial development . . . the
impact will be great." Cahill insisted the number of visitors be reduced to no more than four
million a year and that over-night camping facilities be provided within the park to reduce traffic
and development. He felt this reduction would be easily done "if the recreation area is provided
without the big impoundment of the dam."93The Weston report had recommended construction
of a massive sewerage treatment system to cope with the agricultural run-off from New York
that called rur h e construction of a huge treatment plant and a system of intcrccptors running
through miles of vacant countryside. Cahill felt this proposal adopted by the DRBC was too
expensive and unsightly. Instead he and his team proposed constructing a series of smaller
treatment facilities that would serve existing townships. Cahill went on to the question the
benefits of the dam for water supply and flood control and demanded a total of seven conditions

92

"Statement Concerning the Tocks Island Dam" by William T. Cahill, Governor of New Jersey, given during the
annual meeting of the Delaware River Basin Commission, May 10,1972. Document copy given to Kathleen DucaSandberg by Thomas O'Neill, former executive with NJ DEP.
93
Cahill, May 1972 Statement

be met before New Jersey would agree to move ahead with the project. The most important of
these were: changes to the sewerage treatment plans to control the nutrient run-off and
eutrophication control; the ability to regulate land use on the Jersey side of the Tocks Island
region; federal funding for ncw highway projects to alleviate the burden to New Jersey's
infrastructure; and federal subsidies to offset lost tax revenues due to federal land acquisition.
O'Neill said Cahill's real damage to the dam, however, came fi-om his demand that the estimated
10 million annual visitors to the recreation area be cut by more than half. O'Neill said:

He was raising questions and putting up a caution sign not a stop sign. He gave
the commission 6 months to come up with answers. His reaction was this project
is not going to fly. This put the first substantial roadblock in the way of the dam
without any real friction. This is what slowed down Tocks and eventually made it
possible to stop it. What he really did was make it impossible to comply with his
requests. If you put a ceiling of 4 million park visitors a year on it, they (the Army
Corps) would not be able to get a positive cost benefit analysis. The corps could
no longer justifjr it, not on environmental grounds; they could not justifjr it on
economic grounds. They would not be able to get over the Congressional hurdle
of having a positive cost benefit ratio.94
In order to be able to afford the highways and the sewers, visitor levels had to be held to
no more than 4 million people, which was the number of people you could have with a flowing
river recreation area as opposed to a flat water recreation area (lake) and the bulk of the benefits
the Corps used in their cost benefit analysis did not come from flood control or from water
resources, but from recreation. There were environmental concerns, economic concerns and
political concerns. Local officials Cahill had met with were now adamantly opposed to the
project. "It was one of the first official examples of NIMBY not in my backyard. Cahill put these
challenges in the way of the project," said ~ ' N e i l l . ~ ~
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Support for the dam was diminishing and construction was stalled indefinitely. Many
credit Cahill and the Sullivan report for essentially stopping the dam, but the Army Corps would
not give up. The Corps disagreed with these conclusions, stating that "the Tocks Island Project
meets . . . urgent human requirements in a manner that is more environmentally acceptable,
efficient and economic than any other series of known or feasible alternatives." The DRBC also
declared that without any alternatives "the Tocks Island Reservoir would be the keystone of the
water supply management program in the Delaware ~ a l l e ~ . " ~ ~
After the Army Corps' initial and inadequate environmental impact statement was
publicized, environmentalistsgot involved in the fight to stop the dam, yet they supported the
recreation area and wanted to keep a natural wilderness setting along the river. The National Park
Service developed a new plan, A Natural System Plan for the Delaware Water Gap National
Recreation Area, released in September, 1971. Albert said support for large-scale recreational
lake within the Park Service was eroding. "The natural systems plan deemphasized reservoir
recreation . . . the results of the park service study delighted the environmentalists. Here was
justification for their dam opposition," said ~1be1-t.'~
Park Superintendant John Donahue, who has written some history of Tocks Island Dam
arid was a friend of author Richard Albert, said the growth of opposition to thc dam was "m
event where you can tie a direct nexus between the event and the beginning of the growing
environmental movement. It morphed from a movement about people keeping their homes into
being a movement about seeing that the sacrifice they were making was for a good causepublic lands in perpetuity."98

96

Charles A. Stansfield, Jr., "The Tocks Island Controversy," Parks and Recreation 7 (March 1972), p.31
Albert, p.121
98
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area Superintendant, John Donahue, interviewed by Kathleen DucaSandberg, (February 22,2011).
97

During the next few years numerous impact and engineering studies were conducted
including investigations into various water-supply and flood control alternatives. The
Environmental Defense Fund, who questioned the dam's costs and benefits in 1972, now found
that construction of the dam would encourage development on the dangerous floodplains below
the dam. As Cahill pointed out, during the devastating Flood of 1955, it was not the main stem of
the Delaware River that had caused so much damage and fatalities, but its' various creeks and
tributaries within the floodplain, where homes and camp facilities were swept away. Donahue
said years later the Corps, who continued to test the area, concluded that there were serious
engineering issues with the Tocks Island site. "The place where they wanted to build the dam
turned out to be one of the few places in Pennsylvania where you can 't drill down six inches and
find rock. There was nothing but sand," said ~onahue.'' O'Neill said he believed this still would
not have stopped the Corps from building the dam. They would have resorted to using an
alternative building method instead.
There were still many who continued to support the dam including Pennsylvania
Governor Milton Shapp, the Delaware Valley Council, the New Jersey State Chamber of
Commerce, various labor unions and of course Dressler and members of the WRA-DRB, who
fought back and "had an equally persuasive argument for rejecting every proposed alternative,"
wrote Albert. "The technical battleground would decide nothing. The real argument was
ideological, either you believed that Tocks Island Dam was the long-awaited answer to the water
needs of the Delaware River Basin, or you didn't. It was like religion."'00
The fate of Tocks Island Dam, however, still rested with Congress and the Delaware
River Basin Commission, or essentially the four governors of New York, Pennsylvania,
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Delaware, and New Jersey. By 1973 the DRBC countered CEQ and Governor Cahill's objections
to the dam by changing its policies regarding "nonpoint" pollution-the

chicken and cow

agricultural groundwater runoff from precipitation. It was now to be managed in accordance with
the policies being developed at the federal levcl by the Environmental Protection Agency, an
attempt to divorce the issue from the dam controversy and pass the buck. Some of Cahill's other
conditions were being met, including a reduction in the number of park visitors and agreeing to
build sub-regional sewage treatment plants, but Cahill still demanded federal funding for
highways and lost tax revenues, which was a shift away fkom any lingering environmental
concerns as far as New Jersey was concerned. The CEQ kept insisting New York State provide a
clean-up program to remove 95 percent of any agricultural wastes. Once again in 1973, both the
House and the Senate approved funding for dam construction, but insisted construction could
only begin if these issues were resolved.

Governor Brendan Byrne's White Paper and the Critical Vote Against Tocks
The Delaware River Basin Compact required all water resource projects be approved by
the DRBC and Congress had become impatient with the DRBC's delays. The fact that two
governors now opposed construction proved problematic. Congress pushed the Delaware River
Basin Commission to resolve the dam controversy. On August 28, 1974 Congress appropriated
$1.5 million for a new study of the Tocks Island Dam project, but instead of giving the money to
the Department of Environmental Protection or the National Academy of Sciences to conduct the
study, it gave it to the Army Corps of Engineers. This immediately caused panic and distrust
among those who opposed the dam and who feared this new study would be biased if managed
by the Corps. Instead two neutral New York City consulting firms were given the contract,

engineers URS/Madigan-Praeger and the architectural firm, Conklin and Rossant. Their sixvolume final report assessed the costs of various alternatives, but did not take a position on the
dam itself It again raised numerous environmental and financial concerns that resulted in a
stalemate with both sides declaring victory. It concluded that the project was the most costeffective means to achieve the purposes of flood control, water supply, recreation, and
hydroelectric development in the region, however, they believed recreation would be adversely
affected by eutrophication. The Army Corps interpreted the results differently saying the
Madigan-Praeger study viewed the dam as both feasible and necessary.
In 1974, Brendan Byrne became governor of New Jersey, Malcolm Wilson succeeded
Rockefeller as governor of New York and Delaware's new governor was Sherman Tribbitt. After
Sullivan resigned the DEP, but before Byrne appointed David Bardin to succeed him, Joseph T.
Barber was named Acting Commissioner of the DEP under Byrne. He had been a division
director before DEP was established when it was still the New Jersey Department of
Conservation and Economic Development. "He was an old time Democratic hack-build-a-damguy, who had enough republican connections to maintain an ofice under the Cahill
administration," said 0 ' ~ e i l l ' ~
In' March 1974, Byrne asked Barber for comments on what he
ought to do about Tocks arid Barber encouraged the governor to build the dam. Hc pointcd out
Cahill's seven conditions and brushed each one off in a short two page memo. He claimed the
eutrophication issue was overemphasized and plans to build a major regional sewerage system
had already been abandoned in favor of a decentralized system. He also said there was no need
for more highway construction since the number of visitors had been scaled back to 4 million. "I
believe that action and studies by DRBC and the Corps and other agencies compromise a
reasonable response and assurance that the issues will be resolved," wrote Barber. "It is my
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feeling that the completion of this project is imperative." His reasons were Tocks would provide
water supply for "which there is no alternative" and a source of energy and power plant cooling
water and its flood control use."Only a main stem facility can prevent a repetition of the 1955
disaster downstream. Surveyed in its entirety, it appears that the benefits from the Tocks Island
Dam far outweigh its problems and I would strongly suggest that you fully support this project so
that construction can proceed in 1974."Io2
"This is what would have happened without Richard Sullivan or David Bardin. This was
the old politicians answer to what we should do about Tocks," declared 0Nei11.'03
In conjunction with the new congressionally mandated study being done by MadiganPraeger and Conklin, Byrne asked for a new study of the dam project and the potential impacts
on New Jersey. A new task force was headed by OWeill and Dr. Glenn Paulson, also an assistant
DEP Commissioner, who helped create the state's Supefind cleanup program as well as the
Department's Office of Science and Research. The two began a lengthy new study of Tocks
Island Dam and the recreation area they called "The Decision Options Paper" or "The White
Paper." ONeill said the great virtue of this independent study was that everyone could use the
consultants' numbers and findings. He said a review committee met weekly with the engineering
f i ~ x i sand everyone had to be satisfied. "We used their numbcrs and then fit our policy

preferences to it. That way we lessened the argument from an analytic point of view. The state
simply had very limited analytic plans. It had never been done before," said 0 ' ~ e i l l ' ~ ~
"He (Governor Byrne) wanted a fresh look (at the dam) based on the current
circumstances of the mid 1970s, not a judgment that was dating back to the 1 9 5 0 ~ noted
~"
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Paulson. "He had an open mind. If the perceived needs of decades earlier were still the needs of
today or if there were new needs that justified it . . . then his position would be in favor of it." On
the other hand, if the needs were no longer valid, Byrne would oppose the dam and support
alternatives, said ~ a u l s o n ."It
' ~ ~was a close call for Byrne. He might have gone either way. He
was not a real environmentalist," said New Jersey historian, Donald Linky, who served as Policy
and Planning Director and Chief Counsel to ~ ~ r n e 07Neill
. " ~ said he thought Byrne made a gut
decision using the White Paper to support a decision he already believed in
"Governors don't want to take firm policy stands unless they have to," said
07Neill."They prefer to make decisions on grounds that are unassailable. This
way is going to cost us more money than that. Why get into the controversy of
agreeing or not?"07
Another argument of this thesis is that even though New Jersey Governor Byrne voted
against building Tocks Island Dam in the mid 1970s, an act which ultimately led to deauthorization, this decision was not based on environmental concerns. It was predominantly the
anticipated costs to New Jersey. Paulson and O'Neill, who wrote the report for Bardin, concluded
that New Jersey had adequate alternative water supplies and that the proposed Tocks Island
reservoir, depending on the rainfall and snow melt in a given year, could rise and fall many tens
of feet, which meant that proposed marinas would often be dry and there would be huge mud
flats, "so the recreational values basically had they been asserted were a sham," said Paulson
"Maybe one year out of every several the marinas would have been wet."
O'Neill said land use impact was the most obvious and detrimental aspect of the
recreational lake and the fact that eutrophication would impact of the number of visitor days.
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"The study was not designed to tell you-yes, you should build tocks or not," said
07Neill."It was designed to give an accepted basis of fact and analysis that both
sides could agree on and use as a basis for their analysis. The stunning conclusion
to us was, we did not need Tocks for water supply. In fact we'd be better off
without it for water supply purposes in terms of costs per gallon and those were
costs that we, New Jersey had to meet. It would have been unaffordable for New
lo8.
~erse~
"

Based on the "White Paper" Bardin urged Byrne to consider alternative water resources
that included improvements at the Ramapo, Round Valley, Confluence, Six-Mile Run, Two
Bridges and the Raritan-Passaic Reserviors, the D & R Canal and future conservation measures.
"The New Jersey share of the $120 million estimated water supply fraction of the Tocks Island
Lake would be $44 million, but this would not be available until pipelines were built from the
Delaware to the Raritan and then hooked up. Consumption has not kept up with projections . . . it
would virtually eliminate growth in water demand through 2025. New Jersey seems unlikely to
need the Tocks increment for from 25 to 50 years

. . . it

would be desirable to preserve the option

to build the dam and the lake, but to defer the actual construction," wrote Commissioner Bardin.
"If you believe that a large new lake would be an attractive amenity in pace of the existing
valley, and if you believe it is worth $3 11 million of federal tax money excluding $42 million to
complete land acquisition, you will favor the dam and lake project . . . If you prefer a freeflowing river for at least a generation," Bardin advised Byrne to wait and weight the drought and
flood risks along with more flexible water resource alternatives that would be less expensive for
New ~ e r s e ~ .Again,
' " ~ it was a matter of the costs and Paulson said a day or two after receiving
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their report Byrne came out against the dam. "And without the support of one of the governors
in the three states it basically was a dead issue," said ~ a u l s o n " ~
Governor Byrne recalled:
I've had second thoughts about supporting it once in a while. The initial reasons
for building the dam all seemed very logical, (but) there was a lot of negative
press and squatters protesting. It was more of a social issue. I did not care about
the dam one way or other. I knew there were people, who were concerned about
the issue of water supply, but mostly it was just getting a lot of negative media
coverage and I had the impression that nobody had thought through all of the
possible effects. They didn't know how they were going to deal with the
eutrophication and I could see scum."'
Byrne went on to say that the entire project was a media headache for him and agreed that the
lack of funding in the 60s opened doors later for the environmental movement to make Tocks
Island their cause.
Yes delays from a lack of hnding during LBJ resulted in a lack of appropriations
to the Army Corps-it could have given the environmentalists a window of time
later, but all that did not come into my thinking when I called the shots. It was
really more trouble than it was worth. It was best if the whole thing just went
away. So we kept the park and got rid of the dam."'
Byrne said that he decided to continue pursuing the route Governor Cahill had started by
insisting the number of annual visitors be restricted to four million a year thereby
diminishing the project's mandated cost-benefit. O'Neill recalled:
Yes and that was their biggest problem. They had to try to do that balance sheet
that didn't really work. They were congressionally mandated to prove a cost
benefit and that became the easiest part of it to attack because you couldn't argue
that the cost benefit was fast disappearing and legally they would not be allowed
to build it.
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O'Neill said once he was given the White Paper, Byrne's overriding concern was the cost
effectiveness of building the dam.'% was the politically salient concern he had. It was not
an environmental concern, it's a money concern and everybody can understand that," said
~'Neill"~
With environmental and local opposition mounting, the DRBC met on July 3 1, 1975 to
make a firm decision about whether or not to support the dam. During this meeting, Governor
Byrne, armed with the White Paper, voiced his opposition to the dam, but did not vote to
completely kill the project. He believed New Jersey had sufficient water supply without Tocks
Island Dam, but wanted to keep New Jersey's options open if the state ever needed more water in
the future. New York Governor Hugh Carey (represented by Ogden R. Reid) and Delaware
Governor Sherman Tribbitt also voted to withdraw DRBC support for the dam, while
Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp voted in favor of the project. As the 1975 annual report for
the Water Resources Association of the Delaware River Basin declared, "The Delaware River
Basin Commission on July 3 1, in a closed meeting decided, in a split decision, against
construction start at Tocks Island but for continuation of land acquisition for the Delaware Water
Gap National Recreation Area." Without DRBC support, the Army Corps recommended
Congress de-authori~ethe dam in September 1975, stating that the Corps should transfer the land
it had acquired for the project to the National Park Service for the Delaware Water Gap National
Recreation Area. In the course of subsequent hearings, Major General Ernest Graves, Director of
Civil Works for the Corps, explained that Tocks Island Dam was "the key feature" in the
Delaware River Basin Comprehensive Plan and that the Corps would have to "go fairly far back
toward first base in order to put together a plan that would be workable," but if the DRBC did
not support the project, it was better to deauthorize it than to let it linger. According to Graves,
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the Corps had expended approximately $63.5 million on Tocks Island up to that point, including
553 man-years of manpower.

The testimony of senators and representatives fiom New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
.

and Pennsylvania highlighted this lack of support. Senators Clifford Case (R-New Jersey) and
Jacob K. Javits (R-New York), as well as Representatives Robert W. Edgar @-Pennsylvania),
Millicent Fenwick (R-New Jersey), Benjamin A. Gilman (R-New York), Pierre S. Du Pont (RDelaware), and Helen Meyner (D-New Jersey) now all opposed the Tocks Island Project, with
only Representatives Frank Thompson (D-New Jersey) and Edward J. Patten (D-New Jersey)
coming out in favor of the dam. "The labor unions were really pushing for construction," recalled
Linky, who said Charlie Marciante, then president of the state AFL-CIO withdrew his support
for Byrne when he voted to temporarily stop the dam. Linky said there had been a number of
New Jersey "pork barrel" interests in building the dam, including Congressman Robert Rowe
from Passaic County, who was chair of the House Public Works Committee. "He was a very
aggressive pork barrel guy to go to. He was a very big pro-development and construction guy.
Getting federal appropriations was viewed as a feather in their cap," said Linky.

"'

Residents continued to voice opposition to the dam. "Those of us familiar with the area
had a responsibility to speak up about this matter, surely beforc construction took place," said
Shutaitis, who also testified for de-authorization. Shukaitis disputed that the dam could
effectively fulfill its major purposes, such as flood control and water supply and it would be
better to explore alternatives. Likewise, Harold A. Lockwood, Jr., of both the Save the Delaware
Coalition and the Sierra Club, declared that the dam had been rehashed, restudied, reviewed and
reanalyzed for many years and that the time had come to deauthorize it so that the Delaware
River Basin Commission could get on with meaninghl planning and avoid the conhsion and
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chaos of the last 14 years. Tom Eichler of the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation, called Congress's attention to the project's "serious shortcomings," claiming that
its construction would force New York citizens to assume an even larger financial burden to
control phosphorous discharges to the upper Delaware River. Yet several individuals appeared
before the subcommittee in support of the project. Maurice K. Goddard, secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, represented Governor Shapp' s position
on Tocks Island. He said the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continued its support for the
immediate construction of the Tocks Island Dam and Reservoir project as it had since the project
was first conceived. According to Goddard, deauthorizing Tocks Island would merely "put us
right back to the point where we were 20 years ago, with no immediate means of meeting the
present and future water and water-related needs of the citizens and industry of the four-State
basin and its service area." In a similar way, Joseph F. Radziul of the Philadelphia Water
Department, explained that Tocks Island was the only means to ensure that the Delaware River
Basin would not have "a serious water shortage7'in fiture years. 116
While not supporting immediate construction of Tocks Island, others advocated
continued authorization of the project in the event the need ever became apparent. James W.
Wright, executive director of the DRBC and a representative of Governor Tribbitt of Delaware,
for example, stated that "too many issues remain unresolved as this time to risk the permanent
foreclosure of the Tocks Island Lake project." Wright was especially concerned about salt water
intrusion and whether nonstructural flood control measures could provide an adequate amount of
protection. "Although the Delaware River Basin Commission member-states voted 3-to-1 against
a motion recommending congressional appropriation of Tocks Island construction finds,"
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Wright concluded, "only New York among the four member States has expressed support for
deauth~rization.""~
Congress passed no deauthorization bill in 1976 or in the years immediately
thereafter. The Tocks Island Dam project hung in limbo.
Environmentalists Finally Help Stop the Dam

With the possibility of the dam still lingering, environmental groups and opponents
aimed to ensure that no construction ever occurred by getting Congress to designate the Middle
Delaware River as a wild and scenic river. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, passed by Congress
in 1968, declared that rivers with "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish
and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values" would be "preserved in fiee-flowing
condition.""* President Jimmy Carter signed the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978,
adding the segment from the point where the Delaware River crosses the northern boundary of
the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area to the point where the river crosses the
southern boundary of the recreation area to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System to the
system. In addition, the act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to include all of the Tocks
Island Dam lands in the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area and to acquire any
additional land which the Corps had not yet purchased. In essence, the passage of this legislation
protected the Delaware River and blocked Tocks Island Dam. The same bill, which critics
dubbed, "The Park Barrel Bill," provided parks and recreation areas in forty-four states, three
territories and over 48 percent of the congressional districts in the nation. The inclusion of the
Delaware River and this designation was a victory that can be truly attributed to the
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environmental movement, primarily the national Environmental Defense Fund, but as it has been
explained and reviewed previously, the dam was already mortally wounded, (although not quite
dead yet.) Pennsylvania was still bitterly lobbying for the dam and New Jersey had left itself a 20
year window of opportunity to reassess its water supply needs.
Albert wrote, "Deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam was the next item on the
environmental agenda."'" Clearly, this was an overstatement. For many years, only New York
State favored deauthorization, but not for environmental reasons. Various House and Senate bills
recommending deauthorization were repeatedly introduced during the next decade and all failed.
The dam had lost support of the DRBC and the Army Corps, it's principle players. Yet while
support in Congress waned, there remained many political supporters and legal and technical
issues, primarily the Supreme Court Decree of 1954, which had divided the waters of the
Delaware in the first place and was later satisfied by a regulatory Good Faith Agreement. Brig.
General James Kelley, the head of the Corps North Atlantic Division recommended the project
be deauthorized so that alternative water resources plans could be implemented. Finally,
Congress passed the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 which revamped the Corps of
Engineers' public works programs, stipulating all inactive projects, including Tocks, be
automatically deauthorized if no hnding had been expended on them for ten years. This law was
responsible for the automatic deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam in 1992.
By 1992, the protestors and environmentalists had long since abandoned the Minisink
Valley. "The environmental community dropped the ball when the Park Service showed up,"
said Barry Allen, now associate professor of Environmental Studies at Rollins College, and a
former resident of Flatbrookville and principle organizer in the fight to stop the dam in the
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seventies. "People were concerned about the residents losing their homes, but after the dam
received the Wild and Scenic Rivers designation, both the environmentalists and the Army Corps
pulled out. The Park Service did nothing to preserve the cultural landscape. The historic value of
the area was lost. The environmentalists had dropped the
Congress did not officially deauthorize the project until July, 1992 and only with the
provision that the dam be retained in the DRBC's Comprehensive Plan and reviewed again after
the year 2002. In November, 2000, sixty five miles of the lower Delaware River were added to
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System making seventy five percent of the non-tidal river
between New York State and Trenton, untouchable. The remaining twenty-five percent is too
small for a dam or reservoir. Former Governor Thomas Kean recalled:
In the end it was a combination of factors that finally killed the project.
Environmentalists went on later to make sure the dam could never happen when it
received federal designation as a free-flowing river, but the issue of the dam was
long dead and buried. It was a dead issue because of the cost benefit and that final
study buried it.'''
In February 1979, the Philadelphia District ended its official involvement with the Tocks
Island Project by concluding the transfer of funds and property to the NPS. No longer involved
with Tocks Island, the Philadelphia District did not have a robust workload and, in 1980, it saw
its real estate fknction relocated to the Baltimore District, while engineering, design, and
construction of new projects were also eliminated. By 1981, the staffing of the District had
decreased from nearly eight hundred to below six hundred, emphasizing the dramatic effect that
the killing of the Tocks Island Project had on it. Recognizing that Tocks Island had an effect on
the District's workload, some critics charged District officials with hanging on to the project just
for that reason, even if they knew it was not economically or environmentally justified. Yet
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Corps officials denied this, stating instead that they merely saw it as the best way to meet the
region's needs and that they were just doing what Congress wanted them to do. "Tocks Island
wasn't authorized by a cadre of evil bureaucrats," testified Army Corps Assistant Chief of

EngineeringIConstruction Division John Burnes. "It was authorized by the Congress."
Regardless, the demise of the project had a direct and severe impact on the Philadelphia
District.'22
The project also had a direct impact on the Delaware River Basin itself. Supporters of the
project continued to believe that Tocks Island was the best solution and, at various times in the
1980s and even into the twenty-first century, some talked about trying to resurrect the project.
Whenever a drought or floods hit the area, a number of people continued to respond that a dam at
Tocks Island is still the solution. Clearly, it was difficult for some to let go of Tocks Island,
believing that it was the key to many of the water problems in the Delaware River Basin. In
2002, after extensive research, the Tocks Island Dam Project was officially de-authorized by
Congress. Albert concluded his book by saying it was the War in Vietnam that was the major
reason for the demise of the Tocks Island Dam
The idea was born in an era when an undammed river was considered a wasted
resource and river taming was considered good water conservation. The
momentum of this philosophy carried Tocks Island Dam to the start of
construction, but it was not enough. It was the Vietnam War, however, that kept
the project from being built. In many respects, Tocks Island was the Vietnam War
of the Delaware Valley. As the cost of achieving the underlying goals escalated,
they became confused and were questioned. In 1975 both the dam and the war
collapsed from weakened political support and rising public pressure.123
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The long delay in starting Tocks Island in the 1960s eventually caused its demise.
Ultimately, deauthorization in 1979 and establishment of the Delaware Water Gap National
Recreation Area eliminated serious consideration of a large, main-stem reservoir for control of
floods and droughts on the Delaware River. In the aftermath, the DRBC focused on the
development of rules, regulations and procedures to deal with drought and water conservation
policies entered DRBC7sproject review process. The WRAKIRB maintained close ties to the
DRBC and worked on each of these initiatives, providing technical and policy input and
providing information to its members and the broader public. The DRBC undertook and
completed a "Level B study in May, 1981 to identify alternatives to Tocks Island Dam and this
time they emphasized public participation in the study process.

Residents Finally Get a Voice
Congress established the Citizen Advisory Commission on October 31, 1988, to advise
the Secretary of the Interior on matters pertaining to the management and operation of the
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, as well as on other matters affecting its
surrounding communities, re-chartering this Federal citizen's advisory committee in 1998 for an
additivrial decade. The Secretary of the Interior now appoints the eleven-member committee,
which consists of two members nominated by the Governor of New Jersey, two members
nominated by the Governor of Pennsylvania, two members nominated by the Superintendent of
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, and five County members, nominated by the
county administrations of Sussex and Warren Counties in NJ and Pike, Monroe, and
Northampton Counties in Pennsylvania.
When re-authorization expired in October 2008, Representatives Scott Garret (R-NJ) and

Christopher Carney (D-PA) introduced a bipartisan bill (H.R. 3476) to reauthorize the Delaware
Water Gap National Recreation Area Citizens Advisory Commission through 2018, saying
"Communication is the key to addressing and resolving citizen concerns, and it is clear that
residents and park users value the opportunity to respond to park decisions, as well as propose
alternative ideas." This bill passed the House of Representatives on October 13,2009.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion
Rivers have long been a battleground between those who want to keep them free flowing
and natural and those who want to harness water to create improvements. There are more than
75,000 dams in the United States that affect every major river outside Alaska but one, the
Salmon River in Idaho. In addition to 400 large dams used to control floods, as of 1965 these
dams created more than 26,000 miles of channeled waterways for shipping, 58,000 million acres
of irrigated land and the generation of 30 million kilowatts of hydroelectricity. While these
improvements have been deemed significantly beneficial and essential, river conservationists
have claimed the most complete and permanent destruction of a river is by a dam. Environmental
studies have shown when a dam stops the river's current, the landscape is flooded, the chemistry
and temperature of the water changes and deep water blocks sunlight and stops the growth of
bacteria and other food chain nutrients. Traditionally paid for by the federal government, the cost
of building a dam has drawn negative criticism as well. Cost estimates have increased
dramatically since Tocks Island dam was first proposed at only $75 million in 1965. By 1983 the
cost of building a dam in California was estimated at $2.2 billion.'24
There has only been only one very comprehensive book written about the history of
Tocks Island, but the author, Richard Albert, was undoubtedly an anti-dam environmentalist and
wrote it with that slant. The end of the Tocks Island dam project has always been viewed as a
victory for the growing environmental movement, but there was more to the story and it was
simply a matter of money and time. Tocks Island Dam became irrevocably log-gammed during
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the Carter Administration, but its demise really happened earlier when President Johnson needed
funding to simultaneously fight the War in Vietnam and push through his key domestic
programs. "Guns or Butter" handed the growing environmental movement this later victory.
Budget cuts for smaller projects and programs delayed Tocks Island long enough for it to later
become economically and environmentally unfeasible, especially after the enactment of the
National Environmental Protection Act. In studying the history of Tocks Island Dam, the
possibility of this argument had to be taken into account
Did the environmental movement really cause the demise of Tocks Island Dam and did
environmentalists successfully stop other dams from being built elsewhere? In the late 1990s,
within only a few years of the final deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam, more than 450 new
dam projects were authorized for construction by the Army Corps of Engineers. River
conservationist, Tim Palmer said that even during the War in Vietnam other dams were still
being built despite critical domestic spending shortages, all depending on the amount of
Congressional support they had and if construction was already underway. "Dam projects were
still being hnded then. It depended totally on congressional support for specific projects.
By all means, this project should have been one of many cut by the Johnson administration due
to a lack of funding. 11 had
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been started yet and there was no significant national reason to

keep it except for the tremendous lobbying efforts of those who had "pork barrel" economic
interests in the project such as the WRAIDRB or politicians such as John Saylor, Frank
Thompson or Mike Rowe. O'Neill agreed.
Other dams were being built and they didn't have the opposition that Tocks did.
You talk about building dams out west. There aren't as many people per square
mile as there are in New Jersey. They don't have the same education level or the
income level as people in the east. This is a rich, well-educated, densely populated
125
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state where it is hard to do anything, let alone build a dam without having some
citizens group coming out against it. This is a difficult place to get things done.
The degree of backing by the environmental movement in the seventies was
highly correlated to the degree of income and education level.'26

Was the demise of the Tocks Island Dam project really a "win" for the environmental
movement? At first glance and from a present day environmental history outlook, the answer
would be yes because no dam was built and the river was preserved. However, there were
actually two finales to the Tocks Island Dam project and they needed to be chronologically
separated and examined. The real demise of the dam was between 1965 and 1970, when federal
finding was diverted from the project to pay for the War in Vietnam and poor planning resulted
in diminished cost benefits. This happened years before any significant environmental movement
had taken up the cause to stop the dam's construction. The second effort dragged on for years
before legislation was finally enacted to stop the dam, once and for all, but these efforts were "au
fait accompli."
Viewed historically, the second demise, later in the 1970s considered the "environmental
win," was largely after-the-fact, and a controversy culturally created by the media and state
politicians. This later controversy surrounding the dam was orchestrated primarily by the victims
of social engirleel ing whu had formed coalitions with well-intcntioncd wilderness
conservationists, hippie squatters and some people who might be legitimately considered modern
environmentalists. Regardless of their environmental or altruistic values and motives, the people
who were losing their homes were not as concerned about displacing shad and oysters as they
were about losing the roofs over their heads. These were the people who officially spear-headed
the controversy and were repeatedly interviewed by the press or caught on camera angrily
demonstrating with a mixture of concerned citizens. Although the Army Corps of Engineers
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continued to push ahead, every year their budget was reduced and federal interest waned. Tocks
Island dam was fkndamentally a dead issue years before this second group of "environmental"
supporters took credit for officially halting the project..
The second and later environmental controversy that continued until 1992 and even 2002,
may have served as an ecological epiphany for some, but in the 1960s there were still very few
sympathetic legislators capable of enacting laws to protect the environment and actually not
much widespread public support for local environmental causes. The first Earth Day on April 22,
1970, marked the beginning of the modern environmental movement and attracted national
attention. Even then, opposition to Tocks Island dam was still considered by many to be a
grassroots movement that was used by the overall emerging environmental movement to gain
traction. There was little unity among environmentalistson the Tocks Island project. They
differed on the size of the national park, how many people should be allowed to visit annually,
development of the areas surrounding the park and who should regulate land-use, among other
issues. The State of New Jersey had no master development plan or the means to implement one.
Ironically, it was the hated Corps of Engineers who rightly argued that the creation of the
national park actually saved the surrounding areas, primarily the northwestern corner of New
Jersey, fi-om fbture con~n~ercial
and residential over-dcvclopmcnt. Even today Routes 206,23
and 15 that traverse northern New Jersey are choked with traffic on weekends, mostly with cars
bearing out of state license plates heading towards the Pocono region.
Of course in the mid to late 1960s most elected officials and economic decision makers
did not consider "the environment." They were conservationists, born of the Teddy Roosevelt old
school of preserving natural resources as just that, resources to be used for man's benefit. Even
Former Governor Kean, who later stopped offshore oil drilling and the dumping of medical

waste that was washing up on Jersey shore beaches, implementing the Supefind Cleanup, and
dioxin, radon, asbestos and acid rain programs, called himself a conservationist. Stuart Udall,
Secretary of the Department of the Interior under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson was one
of the biggest supporters of building dams in the 1960s and certainly neither of his bosses was
too concerned with environmental issues. Johnson's administration managed to pass legislation
to stop the further pollution of air and water, but these were not proactive, protective measures-they were reactive, crisis management issues that had found their way onto his plate, which was
already full of social discontent and rhetoric about the War in Vietnam, the Civil Rights
movement, the crushing budget deficit and inflation. Liberals, who were the earliest proponents
of the environmental movement, were viewed to be same people giving Johnson a headache by
protesting against the war, civil rights, women's rights, and other issues.
Ecology never really became a significant issue in the Tocks Island Dam controversy
until later or even after the deauthorization. Engineering studies uncovered and noted possible
adverse impacts, but these remained largely inconclusive and politically insignificant. For
example, if the dam was to cause changes to the salinity of the river's water, scientists believed it
would adversely impact or "simplify" the number of species living in it and create an imbalance
in the ecosystem, but at that time, no one knew wilh oer~aintyjust how much of an impact it
would have created. There just was not enough evidence to justify abandoning the dam because
it might alter the natural environment. There was too much uncertainty.
Emerging environmentalists like O'Neill and Paulson and even Governor Cahill had to
fight people within the newly created New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, who
thought the dam was the only way to meet New Jersey's water supply needs, an idea, which
turned out to be completely without merit once the state and the DRBC conducted new studies

and produced a master water plan and people began to conserve water much in the same way it
became the norm to recycle. O'Neill recalled how much support the dam once had in state
government.
The bureaucracy thought the dam was a great thing to do. Under Governors
Meyner and Hughes, this had been the project everyone wanted--old fashioned,
democratic, public works, public power, build a dam, water power, conservation-the old way of doing things. It was absolutely routine. The Corps of Engineers
knew how to do this stuff and it was supported by the local politicians. But by the
creation of the first Earth Day it proved that the world was changing and the
atmosphere was changing.127
Early on, issues of suburban sprawl, land-use, transportation or eutrophication were not
taken into consideration. No studies considered cost of living increases or population reductions
that have occurred since then. No one agency took responsibility for oversight. Various agencies
remained fragmented and did not coordinate their activities or analysis. Environmental values
were still intangible and had not yet hlly become the responsibility of a single agency or mindset. Significant environmental opposition was only organized after the first Environmental
Impact Statement was issued by the Corps in the 1970s. Earlier, decision makers, who first put
the dam into motion, did not have the benefit of environmental impact data or technical analysis.
The construction of the Erie Canal or the Transcontinental Railroad in the 1860s most likely
caused devastating environmental impacts, but no one thought about the endangered buffalo or
land choking dust bowls. Tocks Island Dam was frozen in a half century of environmental
transition that was provisional, unclear and tentative at best. O'Neill concluded.
The environmental impact statement and other studies did not lead to an effective
decision on the project. The point of any analysis in government, the point of the
environmental impact statement, was not to make the right or wrong decision, but
to define the issues that require a decision at the conclusion of the analysis. If the
process simply leads to delay and conhsion then the analytical process
incorporated into the environmental impact statement has failed.12*
127
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Luckily, the long term goals of the environmental movement gained strength and
survived primarily because of the National Environmental Protection Act. Since the 1970s, the
majority of people came to realize that it is wrong to perpetuate urbanJsuburban sprawl or to cut
down trees without replanting new ones or to kill animals close to extinction. The planet had
grown smaller and as people became more aware of man's place in it and the damage being
caused by carelessness and greed, the environmental movement became mainstream and
accepted. At the time of Tocks Island we might have been on the way, but we still had a long
way to go.
"In retrospect, there is no doubt that the same territory would have lost its virgin natural
resources had this aggressive land grab not take place" said Nancy Shyukaitis, who now in her
mid-80s, is actively working to stop a proposed 146 mile, 500-kilovolt transmission line from
being installed across eastern Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey, right through the middle
of the Delaware Gap National Park. "If the Department of Interior holds fast to its federal
mandate and all the laws governing National Parks prevail, these 72,000 acres will always be the
pride of America, along with more than 200 other federal park treasures. Those of us who were
left to relocate to places away from and outside of the park still have our grand memories of the
'good life' when traffic was nil, there was an absence of noise, real tranquility existed and
paddling on a river was close to heaven."129
Postscript
Jean Zipser lived in an early 18th century structure that was one of the first European
houses built in the Minisink Valley. She was born in that house and lived there most of her short
57-year life. Zipser was the last mayor of Pahaquarry when the former mining town had
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dwindled to a total population of two. She and the other town resident finally gave up and
allowed Pahaquarry to be absorbed into the neighboring Township of Hardyston. This was one
of the first and only times two municipalities have merged in New Jersey. Zipser had worried
that when she died, her ancestral home, which she eventually had to rent from the National Park
Service, would also disappear. A personal friend and fellow journalist, Zipser had staunchly
fought against the dam and was a militant defender of preserving the few remaining historic
buildings that were now part of the national park. "Congress and the president can talk about
preserving history, but until they are willing to put up the money, our history will die," she had
written a few years before she was killed in a single car accident on an icy stretch of poorly
maintained, federally owned, Old Mine Road, where this history began.

APPENDIX
TOCKS ISLAND DAM PROJECT TIMELINE
New Jersey and Pennsylvania sign The Anti-Dam Treaty of 1783 and determine
river island ownership. The Delaware River is considered a common highway and
no dams are allowed.
Lehigh Canal opens and others follow supporting Industrial Revolution demands
for coal. The population explodes and water supply demands increase dramatically.
The Delaware River Development Company is incorporated in New Jersey and
creates the first plans for a dam on the Delaware River.
New York builds New Croton Dam on the Delaware's headwaters.
1907-1928 the Catskill System is built to supply New York City.
The lumber rafting industry has ended on the river.
The Pennsylvania Water and Power Resources Board proposed a dam at Walpack
Bend.
The Delaware River Treaty (Tri-State) Commission was created by New Jersey,
New York and Pennsylvania to equally share the river's water and maintain
minimum flow.
New Jersey sues New York and New York City over Delaware River water rights.
The US Supreme Court rules on the Delaware River Case. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes affirmed each state in the Delaware River Basin has a right to a fair share of
the river's water.
The French Army was defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The United States sends advisors
to Vietnam.
Pennsylvania began studying a Delaware River dam site at Walpack.
Two devastating hurricanes caused record floods along the Delaware in August.
The US Army Corps begins a major study of the Delaware River basin.
The Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee is created.
The Army Corps picks Tocks Island as their preferred site for a dam on the
Delaware.
The Delaware River Basin Compact was adopted by four states and the federal
government.
Tocks Island Dam and upper pumped water storage plans a t Yards Creek were
finalized.

Power companies purchase land including Sunfish Pond from New Jersey and plans
are made to use it for pumped storage to generate electricity.
Tocks Island Dam is authorized by Congress with an estimated cost of $90 million.
There were 11,000 American troops in Viet Nam.
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased an additional $16 million.
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area was established around the
proposed Tocks Lake. The dam would have created a recreational lake surrounded
by a National Park. Water and recreation are measured into a cost-benefit ratio.
There were 150,000 American troops in Viet Nam.
The Army Corps received $1.2 million funding for Tocks but the project start was
way behind. President Johnson starts facing funding shortages because of the W a r
in Viet Nam. The Lenni Lenape League was formed to oppose a pumped-storage
facility that would destroy Sunfish Pond and this attracts attention to Tocks Island
Dam.
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $198 million.
Zme Magazine blasted President Johnson for unnecessary spending on Tocks
Island Dam. Congress appropriated $4 million for Tocks but the Army Corps
budget was reduced. Justice William Douglas hikes to Sunfish Pond in support of its
preservation.
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $203 million.
Johnson began cutting his $4.6 billion public works budget and grappled with
imposing a 1 0 percent tax surcharge to help pay for the war. Inflation is out of
control. There were 534,700 American troops in Vietnam. Congress appropriated
only $3.88 million to the Army Corps for Tocks, but that was cut an additional $1.83
million by the Revenue and Expenditure Act. The project is way behind schedule.
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $214 million.
Congress called for a new evaluation of the Tocks Island Dam Project and funding
was again delayed. The General Accounting Office determined the dam's water
supply benefit was underestimated while the recreational benefits of the dam and
lake were over-estimated by the Army Corps. Only seven percent of the necessary
land had been acquired for the Tocks Project and there were no construction
contracts in place yet.
President Nixon signs the National Environmental Policy Act. The Army Corps was
then required to file an environmental impact statement on Tocks Island Dam.
The Vietnam W a r scaled down, but Nixon cut his public works spending.
Tocks Dam is delayed because an incomplete environmental impact statement was
submitted by the Army Corps. Save the Delaware Coalition was formed uniting
dozens of organizations to fight the dam.
New Jersey Governor Cahill demands conditions be met for NJ's continued support
of the dam, including a reduction of anticipated annual park visitors from 10.5
million to 4 million, which greatly diminished mandatory project revenue benefits.

1974

Congress appropriates funds for an impartial new environmental impact study on
the Tocks Island Dam and stipulates no money be spent on construction or land
acquisition until this study is completed. New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne has a
team of environmentalists privately study the project.

1975

The estimated cost to build Tocks Island Dam increased to $400 million and kept
climbing. Delaware River Basin Commission votes 3 to 1against construction of
Tocks Island Dam. The War in Vietnam is over.

1978

A major section of the Delaware River becomes part of the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers System, effectively blocking future dams.

1983

A Good Faith Agreement was reached by all parties to the US Supreme Court Case
of 1931 and was adopted by the Delaware River Basin Commission.

1986

The Water Resource Development Act reforms and modernizes the Army Corps of
Engineers. No more funds are spent on the dam.

1992

Congress de-authorizes Tocks Island Dam, but retains the option to revisit the issue
if deemed necessary in the future. The Delaware River Basin Commission begins
searching for alternate water sources.

2008

A bill is passed to reauthorize the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area
Citizens Advisory Commission through 2018.
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